| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The actions linked in the emails of the extension (e.g. to confirm a registration or the deletion of an account) do not reject requests with a missing or invalid hash. Instead, the frontend user given in the request is used. Unauthenticated attackers can therefore perform these actions for arbitrary active frontend users. This allows them to retrieve the email address or username of all frontend users and to delete arbitrary frontend user accounts. |
| The HTML content of mails and tracked URLs are rendered unescaped in the backend module. Backend users with access to the mail module can inject arbitrary HTML and JavaScript, which is executed in the context of other backend users viewing the mail preview or report. |
| Content of external URL mails, their stylesheets and images to embed is fetched by the server without validating the target host. Backend users with access to the mail module can make the server send requests to hosts in the internal network. |
| Backend actions and ajax routes of the mail module do not check whether the backend user has access to the page of the requested mail or recipient group. Backend users with access to the mail module can view, change, send and export mails and recipient groups outside their web mounts, including the personal data of recipients. |
| Saving the configuration of the mail backend module writes submitted settings to the page TSconfig without restricting them to the configuration options of the module. Backend users with access to the mail module can write arbitrary page TSconfig. |
| The click tracking middleware does not validate the authentication code of a recipient if the code is omitted. Unauthenticated attackers can retrieve personal data of newsletter recipients, which is inserted into links of sent mails. |
| The click tracking middleware accepts an arbitrary target URL and redirects to it. Attackers can misuse links to the website to redirect users to external sites. |
| The extension hides the correct answer to each CAPTCHA inside the image data of the CAPTCHA itself. Anyone who can request a CAPTCHA image can read the answer from it and submit it, so automated clients can pass the challenge. This applies to the default configuration, because the audio feature that causes the answer to be embedded is enabled by default. Forms that rely on the CAPTCHA as their only protection against automated submissions are exposed to abuse by bots. |
| The AJAX routes of the extension do not check whether a backend user has access to the related module or dashboard widget. Any backend user can therefore retrieve analytics data of the sites they have page access to. |
| In versions running on TYPO3 10 and 11, the configured OpenAI API key is embedded in every backend page, so that the editor plugin can contact the OpenAI service directly from the browser. Any authenticated backend user can read the key and use it at the expense of the site operator. This only applies if an API key has been configured. |
| The extension provides a backend endpoint that writes a submitted value into a submitted field of a submitted page record. It neither checks the user's permissions nor limits which fields can be changed. Any authenticated backend user can therefore change any property of any page, including its access permissions and configuration, outside the scope granted to them. |
| The payment notification endpoint for PayPal accepts incoming data without verifying that it comes from the payment provider. Any site visitor can overwrite the stored payment notification of an order that is still awaiting payment with arbitrary content. This requires a page that contains the shop's order plugin. Orders that are already paid are not affected. |
| The order cancellation function accepts an order identifier from the request and acts on that order without checking that the caller owns it. Any site visitor can set orders that are still awaiting payment to "canceled". This requires a page that contains the shop's order plugin. Orders that are already paid are not affected. |
| Values entered by visitors were placed into the HTML summary email without being escaped. An unauthenticated attacker could use this to inject HTML into an email that is shown to the recipient. |
| The download link for files uploaded through a form relied on a token that could be predicted. The file name in the request was also not verified in a way that resisted guessing. An unauthenticated attacker could use this to access files uploaded by other visitors. In addition, the token was shown in plain text in the text version of the notification email. |
| The extension provides a public proxy endpoint that fetches a URL on behalf of the visitor. For one HTTP request method, the endpoint does not apply the authorization check that protects the other methods, so the URL it fetches is fully controlled by the requester. An unauthenticated attacker can make the server send requests to arbitrary internal or external hosts. The attacker receives the status code and selected response headers, which allows probing of internal hosts and ports. Response bodies are not disclosed. |
| The backend module does not check whether a backend user has access to the requested site. Users with access to the module can therefore open the analytics dashboard of any site. |
| The JSON import of the cookie consent configuration did not respect the backend user's permissions. Non-admin backend users with access to the module could import a configuration that adds arbitrary scripts to the frontend of the website. |
| The backend module for reviewing the consent history accepted sorting, grouping and index options from the request and used them in a database query without validation. Only the filter conditions of that query were bound as parameters. A backend user with access to the history or statistics functions could use this to read arbitrary data from the database, including password hashes of backend and frontend users. |
| The routes that provide consent history and statistics data did not check whether the backend user had access to the module or to the requested page. Any authenticated backend user, regardless of permissions, could therefore retrieve consent data of any site in the installation. |
