| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| The asynchronous Smile parser (NonBlockingByteArrayParser) uses a raw-binary length prefix taken from untrusted input to allocate a byte[] before the body is read, with no upper bound and no overflow check. On the raw-binary marker 0xFD, _decodeVInt() computes (value << 6) + (i & 0x3F) without the (value >>> 25) != 0 overflow guard present in the blocking SmileParser._readUnsignedVInt, and _startRawBinary then allocates the declared length immediately.
A Smile feed of roughly ten bytes can therefore force an eager allocation of approximately 2 GB, producing an OutOfMemoryError on reactive or asynchronous Smile endpoints. A VInt crafted to overflow int yields a negative length and a NegativeArraySizeException, a RuntimeException that is not a JacksonException and so escapes the parser contract. Either outcome crashes the request or processing thread.
This is the same class of issue as CVE-2020-28491 in the CBOR parser of this library, which was fixed with a LONGEST_NON_CHUNKED_BINARY guard; the asynchronous Smile parser never received the equivalent guard. No privileges or user interaction beyond the ability to submit data for parsing are required. |
| CESNET ipfixcol2 2.7.1 before 2.9.0 contains a memory allocation vulnerability in Lz4Decoder::read_start_header() that allows unauthenticated attackers to exhaust memory by declaring unbounded ring buffer sizes. Attackers can open TCP connections sending LZ4 start headers with very large buffer sizes, forcing up to 4 GiB allocations per connection and denying collector service. |
| Unbounded memory allocation and missing frame size validation in Apache NMS ActiveMQ (the .NET OpenWire client, package Apache.NMS.ActiveMQ) before 2.3.0.
The OpenWire unmarshalling code trusted the frame size and the length and count fields read from the network. It did not enforce a maximum frame size, and it did not check that decoded lengths fit within the frame being read. A malicious or compromised broker, or an attacker able to intercept and modify an unencrypted connection, could send a crafted OpenWire frame with an oversized or negative length. This could cause the client to attempt very large memory allocations, leading to excessive memory consumption, an OutOfMemoryException or an uncaught exception, and a denial of service of the client application.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.3.0, which enforces a configurable maximum frame size and validates lengths against the size of the frame being read. |
| isomorphic-git is a pure JavaScript implementation of Git for Node.js and browsers. Prior to 1.38.6, isomorphic-git reads a server-controlled targetSize while applying a packfile delta in src/utils/applyDelta.js and passes it without a bound to Buffer.alloc(targetSize). A malicious or man-in-the-middle-controlled remote can send one delta header that causes git.clone() or git.fetch() to allocate approximately 2 GB before validating the actual delta output. GitPackIndex.fromPack swallows the later size-mismatch error, so a host with sufficient memory may retain the resource waste without a visible failure, while containers, serverless functions, and small virtual machines may terminate. Node.js heap limits do not mitigate the off-heap Buffer allocation. This issue is fixed in version 1.38.6. |
| A security vulnerability has been detected in nipy nibabel up to 5.4.2. The affected element is the function array_from_file of the file nibabel/volumeutils.py of the component Header Handler. The manipulation leads to uncontrolled memory allocation. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance. |
| In Eclipse Vert.x versions [4.0.0, 4.5.35] or [5.0.0, 5.2.2], when a malicious server keeps sending bytes on an EOL-terminated line (not length-prefixed, for example a simple string [1]), we'll keep growing the buffer without bounds, eventually leading to an OOM. We need to have a configurable limit for EOL-terminated lines.
If a malicious server sends a specially crafted RESP response (for example a bulk string [2] with missing CRLF trailer), the parser enters an infinite loop where it keeps parsing the same buffer and pushing the same response to the caller, which may lead e.g. to an OOM if the consumer just buffers the responses. We must fix the parser to avoid this infinite looping. |
| HTTP::Server::PSGI versions before 1.0056 for Perl allow a single request to crash the server by declaring a large Content-Length.
The request body is read with sysread() calls sized by the remaining Content-Length. Perl grows the read buffer to the requested length before any data arrives, so the server tries to allocate as much memory as the client declares.
A remote attacker can send one request with a large Content-Length and a few body bytes, and perl exits with an out-of-memory error before the application is called. HTTP::Server::PSGI runs as a single process, so the server stays down until restarted. |
| Mattermost versions 11.9.x <= 11.9.1, 11.8.x <= 11.8.5, 11.7.x <= 11.7.10, 11.10.x <= 11.10.1 Mattermost fail to apply allocation limits to the byte-string decode paths in its WebSocket msgpack decoder, which allows an authenticated remote attacker to cause excessive server memory allocation via a crafted binary WebSocket frame declaring a Bin32 payload length of up to 4,294,967,295 bytes.. Mattermost Advisory ID: MMSA-2026-00768 |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. An attacker who uses a vulnerability present in versions prior to 6.10.2 can craft a PDF which leads to the RAM being exhausted. This requires accessing an image using `/FlateDecode` with large size values. This has been fixed in pypdf 6.10.2. As a workaround, one may apply the changes from the patch manually. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. Prior to 6.14.0, an attacker can craft a PDF with declared image size values that are much too large compared to the actual data, causing large memory usage in pypdf image parsing. This issue is fixed in version 6.14.0. |
| pypdf is a free and open-source pure-python PDF library. An attacker who uses a vulnerability present in versions prior to 6.10.2 can craft a PDF which leads to the RAM being exhausted. This requires accessing a stream compressed using `/FlateDecode` with a `/Predictor` unequal 1 and large predictor parameters. This has been fixed in pypdf 6.10.2. As a workaround, one may apply the changes from the patch manually. |
| ag-psd is a JavaScript library for reading and writing Photoshop Document files. Before the allocation-limit remediation attempt in version 31.0.0, `readPsd()` commits image and layer buffers from attacker-declared PSD geometry before validating the declarations against the actual available data or sane allocation limits. The `psdReader.js` implementation sizes off-heap typed arrays using `width`, `height`, `channels`, `depth` and `per-layer rectangles`, so a tiny PSD declaring enormous geometry can force multi-gigabyte memory allocation before a later bounds error. The reported 52-byte input on Node 24 produced approximately 3.17 GB peak RSS before a RangeError; under memory pressure the process can be terminated before the error can be caught, and concurrent inputs can exhaust memory. Services reading untrusted PSDs are exposed to denial of service. This differs from genuinely large PSD files whose memory demand is proportional to real input content. Version 31.0.0 adds a composite-image allocation limit, but complete coverage of the separately described layer-rectangle allocation path is not established and requires curator residual/scope review. |
| Web::Simple versions before 0.035 for Perl allocate a buffer sized by the Content-Length header for urlencoded body parameters.
Web::Dispatch::ParamParser::get_unpacked_body_from reads an application/x-www-form-urlencoded body using a single read call, with no cap and the return value ignored. Perl's read grows the buffer to the requested length before reading, so the declared Content-Length determines the allocation.
An attacker can trigger this through any route whose dispatch specification has a % body-parameter match, such as sub (POST + %name=), sending a Content-Length far larger than the body actually sent. No authentication is involved. |
| Memory allocation with an excessive size value in Apache Wicket.
org.apache.wicket.markup.html.form.upload.resource.FileUploadToResourceField uploads files to a separately mounted resource rather than through a form, and is told the outcome afterwards over its own Ajax callback. That callback reads the request parameter filesInfo, a JSON array carrying a client file name, a size and a content type for each file, and turns it into the list of FileUploadToResourceField.UploadInfo that onUploadSuccess() receives. Nothing binds that JSON to an upload the resource performed and nothing re-derives it from the stored files, so the number of entries and every value in them are whatever the request supplied. The callback URL is rendered into the page, no prior upload is required, and both GET and POST reach it, so any client that can load the page can have the component report files that were never uploaded, without authenticating beyond whatever the page itself requires and without any user interaction.
UploadInfo#get(), which the class offers as the way to obtain the bytes of an upload, allocates a byte array from UploadInfo#getSize() before it opens the file. The array is therefore sized by the number the request supplied, and the allocation happens even for a file that was never stored. One small request can cost the server close to two gigabytes of heap, and the request is trivially repeatable, so a few of them exhaust the heap for every request the Java virtual machine is serving. A size that the conversion to int turns negative instead throws NegativeArraySizeException, which the exception handler inside that method does not cover, so it escapes into the application.
An application is affected where it uses FileUploadToResourceField, which is not the ordinary upload path through FileUploadField and Form and has to be extended and mounted deliberately. The allocation additionally requires the application to call UploadInfo#get() rather than reading UploadInfo#getFile() itself. Where the application denies the ENABLE action on the field through its authorization strategy, the callback is refused like any other listener. The 8.x line does not contain this component and is not affected.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.14.0 through 9.24.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.11.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 9.25.0 or 10.12.0, which fix the issue. |
| A flaw was found in Wildfly. A remote unauthenticated attacker can trigger OutOfMemoryError as CSIv2Util's GSS token decoder reads an attacker-controlled length field without bounds checking and attempts to allocate a byte array of that size. |
| Crass is a Ruby CSS parser that's fully compliant with the CSS Syntax Level 3 specification. Prior to 1.0.7, Crass converts `CSS scientific notation` number values with unbounded exponentiation before clamping the result to `Float::MAX`. Applications that use Crass to parse attacker-controlled CSS strings can be forced to spend disproportionate CPU and memory parsing a tiny input, potentially resulting in a crash. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.7. |
| LibreDWG is a free C library to read and write DWG files. Prior to 0.14, a specially crafted R13-R2000 DWG can trigger algorithmic resource exhaustion in `decode_R13_R2000` in `src/decode.c`. The class-decoding loop performs `realloc` on every iteration without a sanity check on `num_classes`. Manipulating that field forces an extremely slow allocation loop and denial of service when the file is parsed. Running the parser in a sandbox with memory limits is a workaround rather than a remediation. This issue is fixed in version 0.14. |
| Open Neural Network Exchange (ONNX) is an open standard for machine learning interoperability. Prior to 1.22.0, _unpack_2bit() and _unpack_4bit() resize unpacked arrays according to attacker-controlled TensorProto.dims without verifying that raw_data or int32_data encodes the declared number of elements. Materializing an untrusted UINT2, INT2, UINT4, INT4, or FLOAT4E2M1 tensor through onnx.numpy_helper.to_array() or onnx.reference.ReferenceEvaluator can therefore expand a small packed payload into a disproportionately large allocation and exhaust memory. This issue is fixed in version 1.22.0. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, the MariaDbPoolConnection.recover() and MariaDbPoolPinnedConnection.recover() implementations trusted the gtrid_length and bqual_length columns returned by XA RECOVER. The methods allocated and split Xid byte arrays without validating the lengths against Xid.MAXGTRIDSIZE, Xid.MAXBQUALSIZE, or the actual data payload. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could cause large allocations, NegativeArraySizeException, or ArrayIndexOutOfBoundsException during XA recovery. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11. |
| MariaDB Connector/J is used to connect applications developed in Java to MariaDB and MySQL databases. From 3.0.0 until 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11, when CLIENT_SESSION_TRACK was negotiated, the OkPacket.parse() and OkPacket.parseWithInfo() paths allocated byte arrays using server-declared lengths for the OK packet info field and session-state variable names and values before confirming that the bytes remained in the packet. A malicious or compromised server, or a machine-in-the-middle attacker, could send a small OK packet declaring a much larger length and repeatedly force attacker-controlled heap allocations before the subsequent copy failed. This could create garbage-collection pressure or an OutOfMemoryError in the client application. This issue is fixed in versions 3.3.7, 3.4.5, and 3.5.11. |
