| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Pocket ID is an OIDC provider that allows users to authenticate with their passkeys to services. From 2.6.0 until 2.9.0, frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.ts reads the redirect_uri query parameter and frontend/src/routes/authorize/+page.svelte uses the raw callbackURL in redirectWithError when prompt=none cannot complete silent authorization. The client-side path only blocks javascript and data schemes and does not invoke the backend callback allow-list validation, so an unauthenticated attacker who knows a valid client_id can redirect a victim browser to an arbitrary HTTP or HTTPS origin for phishing or OIDC error and state smuggling. This issue is fixed in version 2.9.0. |
| Quivr versions through 0.0.322 fail to validate chat ownership in the GET /chat/{chat_id}/history, DELETE /chat/{chat_id}, and POST /chat/{chat_id}/question/answer endpoints. Authenticated attackers can read other users' conversation histories including private knowledge base content, delete arbitrary chats, and inject fabricated messages into other users' conversations. |
| Twenty through 2.35.0 contains an open redirect vulnerability in the OAuthPropagatorController.propagateOAuthCallback endpoint that treats the state query parameter as a redirect URL. Attackers can craft malicious requests to redirect users to arbitrary hosts while forwarding OAuth authorization codes, bypassing domain validation when IS_MULTIWORKSPACE_ENABLED is disabled. |
| Vikunja is an open-source self-hosted task management platform. Prior to 2.4.0, POST /api/v1/projects/{project}/views/{view}/buckets/{bucket} allows the request body project_view_id value to be mass assigned by Bucket.Update in pkg/models/kanban.go. The permission check validates that the bucket currently belongs to the URL project and view but does not validate the body selected destination view, allowing any authenticated user to relocate an attacker-owned bucket into another tenant’s Kanban view. The injected bucket retains attacker-controlled content and ownership, enabling cross-tenant defacement. This issue is fixed in version 2.4.0. |
| Hatchet is a platform for orchestrating background tasks, AI agents, and durable workflows at scale. From 0.40.0 until 0.91.1, the Dispatcher gRPC service does not verify that a request's worker ID belongs to the tenant identified by the bearer-token context in Dispatcher/UpsertWorkerLabels and Dispatcher/Unsubscribe. An authenticated owner of any tenant who guesses another tenant's worker UUID can overwrite that worker's affinity labels or disconnect the worker from the dispatcher. This can cause cross-tenant integrity impact and denial of service on multi-tenant Hatchet Cloud or shared self-hosted deployments. Single-tenant deployments are not practically affected because the attacker and target tenant are the same. This issue is fixed in version 0.91.1. |
| C12.22 protocol dissector crash in 4.6.0 to 4.6.7 and 4.4.0 to 4.4.18 allows denial of service |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover treats a parameter of a nested mutual fixpoint as uniform without examining calls between the different bodies of that fixpoint. find_uniform_parameters in kernel/inductive.ml inspects only self-recursive calls, so when no body calls itself the function concludes that every parameter is uniform. A parameter that grows through a cross-call from one body to another therefore keeps the subterm specification it inherited from the enclosing fixpoint, and a recursive call guarded by that specification is accepted although the argument is not structurally smaller. A non-terminating definition is admitted as structurally decreasing, which yields a term whose value equals its own successor and so a proof of False, from which any proposition follows. The proof requires no axioms, plugins or unsafe flags and Print Assumptions reports it as closed under the global context. Introduced in Coq 8.20 and fixed in Rocq 9.2.0. |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not recheck the recursive tree representation of an inductive type parameter after that parameter has been changed by transport. A fixpoint may apply a rewrite along an equality between types to its recursive argument, which the guard checker accepts because the inductive type is preserved, while the recursive tree recorded for the parameter is altered. A second fixpoint that calls the first inherits the altered recursive tree without verification, so a call that is not structurally decreasing is accepted as terminating. The resulting non-terminating definition proves that a natural number equals its own successor and therefore False, from which any proposition follows. The demonstration uses two axioms that follow from univalence and are consistent with the calculus of inductive constructions, so the contradiction comes from the guard check rather than from the assumptions. A fix is proposed but not merged. |
| The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not follow recursive calls made through a fixpoint's own arguments. A fixpoint may pass itself as a higher-order argument to a second fixpoint, which then applies it to a value that is not a subterm of the structural argument. Passing the recursive function to a plain definition is rejected because the checker unfolds the definition and observes the call, but passing it to a fixpoint is accepted because higher-order recursive calls through fixpoint arguments are not tracked. This admits a type that is definitionally equal to its own negation, so self-application produces False in purely definitional code, without tactics, axioms, plugins or unsafe flags, and Print Assumptions reports the result as closed under the global context. Fixed in Rocq 9.2.0. |
| The WP Courses LMS – Online Courses Builder, eLearning Courses, Courses Solution, Education Courses plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 3.2.29 via the 'resultID' parameter due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with custom-level access and above, to read any other user's quiz answers and scores by enumerating the incrementing resultID value via the wpcq_get_quiz_result AJAX action. The only access control on this endpoint is a nonce check (wpc_nonce) that is exposed to every logged-in user on the frontend, providing no meaningful authorization barrier. |
| ** REJECT ** DO NOT USE THIS CANDIDATE NUMBER. ConsultIDs: CVE-2026-78278. Reason: This candidate is a reservation duplicate of CVE-2026-78278. Notes: All CVE users should reference CVE-2026-78278 instead of this candidate. All references and descriptions in this candidate have been removed to prevent accidental usage. |
| The permission check for the frontend management update flow verified a different event than the one the request went on to modify. A user with frontend event management access could therefore modify events belonging to other organizers. |
| The frontend topic editing flow does not verify on the server side that the requesting visitor owns the topic being modified. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a topic from the public forum can submit a modified update request for that topic directly and overwrite its content, without the application confirming ownership. Topic identifiers are visible in the public forum listing, and exploitation requires no privileged access or non-default configuration. |
| The frontend company self-service editing feature relies on a template-level visibility flag to hide the edit form for company records a visitor does not own, but the corresponding write operation does not repeat this ownership check on the server side. As a result, a visitor who knows the identifier of a company record from the public directory can submit a modified update request for that record directly and overwrite its data, without the application ever confirming that the visitor owns it. |
| The extension resolves the targeted club record from a user-supplied request argument in its frontend edit, update, and activate actions, but performs no ownership check in any of them. An unauthenticated visitor who knows the UID of a club record can send a direct request to the update or activate action and overwrite that record, or publish one still awaiting approval, without owning it. |
| The extension validates the HMAC of a frontend employee edit link only in the action that renders the edit form, not in the action that persists the change. An unauthenticated visitor who knows the UID of a visible employee record can send a direct POST request to the update action and overwrite that record without a valid edit link or any ownership check. |
| The extension's user detail view fails to verify that a requested user record matches the configured or logged-in target, allowing any visitor with access to the Detail or List plugin to retrieve another frontend user's profile data, including name, email, date of birth and address, by supplying an arbitrary user ID. |
| The extension fails to properly validate the expiration of a client-supplied JWT token, allowing an attacker in control of a valid API key to authenticate with an expired token. Exploitation requires the attacker to already be in control of the SYSSY project's API key. |
| The extension's frontend detail-view document lookup does not apply the current site's siteHash filter or frontend user access filter, unlike the regular search path. A visitor who can obtain or guess a valid Solr document id can retrieve documents through this lookup without the same access restrictions enforced elsewhere. |
| UNIX symbolic link (symlink) following vulnerability in ilya-zlobintsev/LACT allows for local denial-of-service. This issue affects LACT: through 0.10.0. |
