| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: sunplus: fix error handling in sp_uphy_init()
Fix the error paths of sp_uphy_init() to undo exactly what each stage
did: return directly if clk_prepare_enable() fails, release only the clock
if reset_control_deassert() fails, and jump to err_reset if
update_disc_vol() fails so the clock and reset are not leaked. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware_loader: do not queue completed sysfs fallback requests
fw_load_sysfs_fallback() calls device_add() before adding the fw_priv to
pending_fw_head. device_add() publishes the fallback loading interface, so
a userspace helper which discovers the device by scanning sysfs can write 0
to the loading attribute and complete the request before it is queued as
pending.
In that interleaving firmware_loading_store() calls fw_state_done() while
pending_list still points to itself, so it cannot remove an entry from
pending_fw_head. The subsequent unconditional list_add() then queues an
already-completed fw_priv. Once the request is released, pending_fw_head
can retain a pointer to freed memory and the next fallback request can
fault while validating the list.
Only in-flight fallback requests need suspend or reboot abort handling. If
the request is already DONE after device_add(), return success from the
fallback path without sending another uevent, waiting again, or queueing it
as pending. This preserves the invariant that pending_fw_head contains only
active fallback requests. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hugetlbfs: release subpool on fill_super failure
hugetlbfs_fill_super() allocates a hugepage subpool when size or min_size
mount options are specified. hugepage_new_subpool() may also reserve huge
pages for min_size.
If root dentry creation fails after the subpool is created, the failure
path frees the subpool with kfree(). This bypasses hugepage_put_subpool()
and can leave min_size reservations charged.
Use hugepage_put_subpool() on the failure path, matching the normal
put_super path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
phy: qcom: snps-femto-v2: Fix possible NULL-deref on early runtime suspend
Runtime PM must be enabled before creating the PHY, since phy_create()
only enables runtime PM on the PHY device if it is already enabled on
this parent device. However, the runtime PM callbacks dereference the
hsphy instance, which is not yet ready, leaving a window where a suspend
callback may trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
Take a runtime PM usage reference with pm_runtime_get_noresume() before
enabling runtime PM and release it once the PHY has been created, so that
no runtime suspend can run before the PHY is ready. This also prevents a
short window where an unnecessary runtime suspend can occur.
Use the devres-managed version to ensure PM runtime is symmetrically
disabled during driver removal for proper cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid5: round bitmap stripes with sector division
raid5_bitmap_sector_map() aligns the array range to full RAID5 stripe
widths before converting it to component sectors. That width is
chunk_sectors multiplied by the number of data disks, and it is not
always a power of two.
Reproduce with a 4-disk RAID5, 1024-sector chunks, and three data disks.
The full-stripe width is 3072 sectors. For a one-sector write at array
sector 3072, correct rounding gives array range [3072, 6144), which maps
to component range [1024, 2048). The old round_down()/round_up() logic
instead gives [1024, 4096), which maps to [0, 1024).
Use sector_div() based arithmetic so the rounded range is aligned to the
actual RAID5 stripe width.
The deterministic mapper test now reports the fixed component range as
[1024, 2048), while the old mask-based range was [0, 1024). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/md-llbitmap: stop daemon timer rearm on destroy
llbitmap_destroy() deletes pending_timer before flushing
md_llbitmap_io_wq. However, daemon_work can still be queued or running
after the timer has been deleted, and the daemon path can arm
pending_timer again when it finds dirty chunks that are not ready to
flush yet.
If that happens during teardown, pending_timer can remain armed after
llbitmap is freed and later dereference freed memory.
Add a BITMAP_SHUTDOWN bit to llbitmap->flags, set it before deleting
the timer, and make the timer and daemon paths stop queueing or rearming
work once teardown starts. Cancel daemon_work before flushing the shared
workqueue so no already queued daemon instance can race with the free.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() so a daemon instance that passed the shutdown
check before teardown cannot rearm the timer afterward.
BITMAP_SHUTDOWN is a runtime-only state. Mask it out when reading and
updating the llbitmap superblock so the shutdown state is never loaded
from disk or persisted to disk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
md/raid1: don't set array_frozen in raid1_takeover()
raid1_takeover() sets conf->array_frozen = 1 on the newly-allocated
r1conf and nothing ever clears it, so every I/O to the array stalls
permanently once _wait_barrier() sees it stuck at 1.
This used to be harmless: level_store() called mddev_resume() right
after pers->run(), which called raid1_quiesce(mddev, 0) and cleared
array_frozen back to 0 regardless of what raid1_takeover() set. Commit
b39f35ebe86d ("md: don't quiesce in mddev_suspend()") removed that
quiesce(mddev, 0) call, so the pre-set now sticks.
setup_conf() already zero-initializes the new r1conf via kzalloc, so
just don't set array_frozen here.
Same class of bug as commit 892da88d1cd9 ("md/raid10: fix a
'conf->barrier' leakage in raid10_takeover()"), also triggered by
b39f35ebe86d. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: etm4x: fix underflow for usage of (nrseqstate - 1)
According to IHI006H Embedded Trace Macrocell Architecture
Specification[0], TRCSEQEVR<n> is implemented only when
TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b100, in which case n ranges from 0 to 2;
otherwise, TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
IOW, the number of usage in the initialisation or setting
TRCSEQEVR<n> with drvdata->nrseqstate - 1 in the loop could make
underflow issue when TRCIDR5.NUMSEQSTATE is 0b000.
Therefore, introduce nr_seq_ctrls field and untie it from nrseqstate.
As part of this introduce ETM_MAX_SEQ_TRANSITIONS macro and
apply nr_seq_ctrls and above macro to TRCSEQEVR<n> relevant fields setup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
coresight: etm4x: missing cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() in perf enable
In the perf enable path, there are missing cases where
cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config() is not called:
- Branch broadcast is selected but not supported by the hardware
- etm4_enable_hw() fails
This can lead to a leak of config_desc->active_cnt.
Fix this by properly calling cscfg_csdev_disable_active_config()
in these error paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf: arm_pmuv3: Zero initialize hw_id branch stack field
PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX is supported by BRBE so hw_id is passed to
userspace, but it's never set by the BRBE driver. Zero initialize it as
it should be according to the docs:
* For the architectures whose raw branch records are
* already stored in age order, the hw_idx should be 0.
It's probably too risky to remove PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_HW_INDEX from BRBE
now in case anyone is setting it and reading the value, but zero
initializing the whole struct also protects against the same issue with
new fields that are added in the future. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm_mpam: Disable driver unbind to avoid UAF
When a user unbinds an MSC and that MSC is the only MSC left for a
component then the corresponding mpam_component will be freed. If the user
then goes on to read the schemata file in the resctrl filesystem then the
mpam_component will be accessed from resctrl_arch_get_config() leading to a
use after free.
As the MPAM driver is not a module the unbind sysfs interface is the only
way to trigger the remove. Instead of dealing with the complexity of
allowing some unused MSC to unbind just remove the unbind sysfs interface. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: sd: Fix special_vec mempool leak when scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails
sd_set_special_bvec() allocates a special payload page for UNMAP and
WRITE SAME commands. If scsi_alloc_sgtables() fails afterward in
sd_setup_unmap_cmnd() or sd_setup_write_same{10,16}_cmnd(), the SCSI
midlayer does not call uninit_command() because RQF_DONTPREP is not set
yet, leaking the page.
Call sd_uninit_command() on error, and clear RQF_SPECIAL_PAYLOAD after
freeing the page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: zoned: don't force read-only on transient -EAGAIN from reloc merge
On a zoned FS, btrfs_delayed_refs_rsv_refill() returns -EAGAIN whenever
the over-committed metadata plus the zone_unusable bytes exceeds the
usable size in a metadata block-group to avoid heavy over-commit of
metadata and early ENOSPC in one transaction.
If this happens while doing reclaim, the transaction is getting aborted.
Treat -EAGAIN as a soft, retryable condition in case of block-group
reclaim. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: always wait for ordered extents to avoid OE races
[BUG]
Syzbot reported a bug that there can be conflicting OEs for the same
range:
BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object alrea[ 179.162726][ T6897] BTRFS critical (device loop4): panic in insert_ordered_extent:264: overlapping ordered extents, existing oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x1089, new oe file_offset 16384 num_bytes 430080 flags 0x80 (errno=-17 Object already exists)
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ordered-data.c:264!
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/09/2026
RIP: 0010:btrfs_alloc_ordered_extent+0x943/0xad0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
cow_file_range+0x744/0x12a0
fallback_to_cow+0x5ea/0xa00
run_delalloc_nocow+0x110c/0x17a0
btrfs_run_delalloc_range+0xbe4/0x1c20
writepage_delalloc+0x104d/0x1ba0
btrfs_writepages+0x1667/0x28b0
do_writepages+0x338/0x560
filemap_fdatawrite_range+0x1f2/0x300
btrfs_fdatawrite_range+0x54/0xf0
btrfs_direct_write+0x6a0/0xc30
btrfs_do_write_iter+0x329/0x790
do_iter_readv_writev+0x624/0x8d0
vfs_writev+0x34c/0x990
__se_sys_pwritev2+0x17a/0x2a0
do_syscall_64+0x174/0x580
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
</TASK>
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[CAUSE]
Since commit ff66fe666233 ("btrfs: fix incorrect buffered IO fallback
for append direct writes"), if the direct IO finished short, we will
revert the isize back to the original one, so that append writes can be
respected during the buffered fallback.
Normally we rely on lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() function during
buffered writeback to wait for any existing ordered extents.
But that ordered extent waiting only happens if the start_pos is inside
the isize.
Since we have reverted the isize during failed direct IO, we will not
wait for any ordered extents.
This means we can have a race where the direct IO OE is still in the
tree, finished but not yet removed, then we're inserting the OE for the
buffered write, causing the above crash.
[FIX]
Make the OE wait to be unconditional, to handle the reverted isize
situation.
And since lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() now either lock the
extents or return -EAGAIN, also remove the branches that handles
no-extent-locked cases, and rename it to remove the "_if_need" suffix.
The following micro benchmark shows the runtime difference for
btrfs_buffered_write(), doing `xfs_io -f -c "pwrite 0 1m"` workload,
all values are the average runtime in nano seconds.
function runtime | before | after
-----------------------------------+-------------+---------------
lock_and_cleanup_extent_if_need() | 58.2 | 183.0
btrfs_buffered_write() | 2115.6 | 2973.3
The overall runtime of btrfs_buffered_write() is still pretty
tiny (still less than 3 micro seconds), I'd say the extra cost is still
acceptable.
An alternative to fix this problem is to wait ordered extents during
iomap_end() where the isize revert is done.
But that solution will break nowait requirement, as if a nowait direct
IO finished short, we have to wait for the OEs unconditionally or the
next append buffered IO can still hit the same problem.
So here we have to move the wait cost to buffered write, but at least
the code is slightly more streamline. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: virtio_bt: avoid OOB read of build info string
The virtbt_setup_zephyr() sends the Zephyr vendor command 0xfc08 (Read
Build Information) and hands the response to bt_dev_info() and
hci_set_fw_info() as a "%s" string starting at skb->data + 1, without
checking the length. A backend that answers with status only leaves that
pointer past the end of the received data, so the walk reads adjacent
slab memory until it meets a NUL. Those bytes reach the kernel log and
the firmware-info debugfs file.
To fix this, print the string with a bounded "%.*s" limited to
skb->len - 1. A short or unterminated response then prints as much as
arrived instead of failing setup.
This mirrors commit dd068ef04412 ("Bluetooth: bpa10x: avoid OOB read of
revision string in bpa10x_setup()"), which fixed the identical pattern. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: light: gp2ap002: Fix unbalanced runtime PM on repeated event writes
The IIO core does not filter duplicate writes to the event enable
attribute, so writing the same value twice invokes
write_event_config() twice. Enabling twice leaks a runtime PM
reference, preventing the device from ever suspending again;
disabling twice underflows the usage count and triggers a
"Runtime PM usage count underflow" warning.
Bail out early when the requested state matches the current state.
While at it, switch to pm_runtime_resume_and_get() so a failed
resume is propagated to userspace instead of silently marking the
event enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: cls_api: fix teardown of an adopted proto on insert-race loss
In tc_new_tfilter() the create branch sets tp_created = 1 before calling
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique(). When the caller loses the race (another
request inserted a proto at the same chain/prio first), insert_unique()
destroys the caller's own tp_new and returns the winner's proto with an
extra reference. tp_created was never cleared, so the loser's errout
path treated the winner's live proto as its own and called
tcf_chain_tp_delete_empty() on it, silently unlinking an active
classifier that the winning request already advertised via
RTM_NEWTFILTER.
Track the outcome of the insert step in a single tri-state variable so
each errout path reacts correctly:
- TP_NOT_CREATED: no proto created; pursue the old path.
- TP_CREATED: proto inserted successfully; same code path as before.
- TP_NOT_OWNED: New - lost the insert race; tp is another request's proto
(chain ref already released by tp_new's destroy)
Both errout reactions are single expressions derived from the state.
This fix is motivated by the Sashiko's automated review of Patch
(net/sched: cls_api: Always acquire rtnl_lock when destroying locked
classifiers) [1][2]. The review identified the silent-unlink behaviour of
an adopted proto's teardown when a request loses the
tcf_chain_tp_insert_unique() race.
[1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com
[2] https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260801125632.360365-1-jhs%40mojatatu.com |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix mmap_lock leak in irq_work path
stack_map_get_build_id_offset() introduced a per-CPU irq_work to defer
mmap_read_unlock() from NMI context, and bpf_find_vma() later reused the
same mmap_unlock_work. Both callers only check whether the work is busy
before taking mmap_lock, so a nested caller can reuse the slot before the
first caller queues it. Two read locks may then be acquired while only one
deferred unlock runs, leaking a read lock and blocking exit_mmap().
Reserve the per-CPU slot before mmap_read_trylock(). Use the same wrapper
in stackmap and bpf_find_vma() so both callers release the reservation on
trylock failure. Keep rejecting the slot while the irq_work remains busy.
Release it after the irq_work callback unlocks the mm. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fbdev: kyro: Validate overlay viewport coordinates
The overlay viewport end coordinates are computed from the viewport
origin and dimensions using 32-bit unsigned arithmetic. Large input
values can cause these calculations to wrap around before the resulting
coordinates are passed to SetOverlayViewPort().
SetOverlayViewPort() packs the viewport coordinates into 16-bit
register fields. The X coordinates are additionally adjusted by +2
and +1 before being written. Validate the coordinate calculations
for 32-bit wraparound and ensure that the adjusted coordinates fit
within their 16-bit register fields before calling
SetOverlayViewPort().
Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/vt-d: Fix iopf_refcount leak on RID domain replacement
intel_iommu_attach_device() enables IOPF for the new domain but never
disables it for the old one. device_block_translation(), called at the
start of the function, tears down translation but does not touch any IOPF
state; blocking_domain_attach_dev() has to call iopf_for_domain_remove()
explicitly before invoking it for exactly this reason.
identity_domain_attach_dev() has the same problem. Its comment claims
that no PRI handling is needed because the device has been put in the
blocking state, but the blocking state and the IOPF reference count are
independent of each other.
As a result, replacing a domain that has an iopf_handler with another
domain at RID level leaks a reference in info->iopf_refcount. The count
never drops back to zero, so iopf_queue_remove_device() is never called
and iommu_disable_pci_pri() triggers its WARN_ON(info->iopf_refcount)
when the device is released.
The PASID paths already handle this correctly by way of
iopf_for_domain_replace(); convert the two RID paths to do the same.
Using the replace helper rather than a bare remove keeps the enable
before the disable, so the reference count does not transiently reach
zero and evict the device from the IOPF queue. |
