| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smc: Fix use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler().
With Eric's ref tracker, syzbot finally found a repro for
use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler() by kernel TCP
sockets. [0]
If SMC creates a kernel socket in __smc_create(), the kernel
socket is supposed to be freed in smc_clcsock_release() by
calling sock_release() when we close() the parent SMC socket.
However, at the end of smc_clcsock_release(), the kernel
socket's sk_state might not be TCP_CLOSE. This means that
we have not called inet_csk_destroy_sock() in __tcp_close()
and have not stopped the TCP timers.
The kernel socket's TCP timers can be fired later, so we
need to hold a refcnt for net as we do for MPTCP subflows
in mptcp_subflow_create_socket().
[0]:
leaked reference.
sk_alloc (./include/net/net_namespace.h:335 net/core/sock.c:2108)
inet_create (net/ipv4/af_inet.c:319 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:244)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1546)
smc_create (net/smc/af_smc.c:3269 net/smc/af_smc.c:3284)
__sock_create (net/socket.c:1546)
__sys_socket (net/socket.c:1634 net/socket.c:1618 net/socket.c:1661)
__x64_sys_socket (net/socket.c:1672)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:50 arch/x86/entry/common.c:80)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:120)
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tcp_write_timer_handler (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:378 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:624 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:594)
Read of size 1 at addr ffff888052b65e0d by task syzrepro/18091
CPU: 0 PID: 18091 Comm: syzrepro Tainted: G W 6.3.0-rc4-01174-gb5d54eb5899a #7
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.0-1.amzn2022.0.1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:107)
print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:320 mm/kasan/report.c:430)
kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:538)
tcp_write_timer_handler (net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:378 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:624 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:594)
tcp_write_timer (./include/linux/spinlock.h:390 net/ipv4/tcp_timer.c:643)
call_timer_fn (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:207 ./include/trace/events/timer.h:127 kernel/time/timer.c:1701)
__run_timers.part.0 (kernel/time/timer.c:1752 kernel/time/timer.c:2022)
run_timer_softirq (kernel/time/timer.c:2037)
__do_softirq (./arch/x86/include/asm/jump_label.h:27 ./include/linux/jump_label.h:207 ./include/trace/events/irq.h:142 kernel/softirq.c:572)
__irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:445 kernel/softirq.c:650)
irq_exit_rcu (kernel/softirq.c:664)
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt (arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1107 (discriminator 14))
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: cls_u32: Undo tcf_bind_filter if u32_replace_hw_knode
When u32_replace_hw_knode fails, we need to undo the tcf_bind_filter
operation done at u32_set_parms. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: exc3000 - properly stop timer on shutdown
We need to stop the timer on driver unbind or probe failures, otherwise
we get UAF/Oops. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/mlx5e: xsk: Fix crash on regular rq reactivation
When the regular rq is reactivated after the XSK socket is closed
it could be reading stale cqes which eventually corrupts the rq.
This leads to no more traffic being received on the regular rq and a
crash on the next close or deactivation of the rq.
Kal Cuttler Conely reported this issue as a crash on the release
path when the xdpsock sample program is stopped (killed) and restarted
in sequence while traffic is running.
This patch flushes all cqes when during the rq flush. The cqe flushing
is done in the reset state of the rq. mlx5e_rq_to_ready code is moved
into the flush function to allow for this. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: VMAP_STACK overflow detection thread-safe
commit 31da94c25aea ("riscv: add VMAP_STACK overflow detection") added
support for CONFIG_VMAP_STACK. If overflow is detected, CPU switches to
`shadow_stack` temporarily before switching finally to per-cpu
`overflow_stack`.
If two CPUs/harts are racing and end up in over flowing kernel stack, one
or both will end up corrupting each other state because `shadow_stack` is
not per-cpu. This patch optimizes per-cpu overflow stack switch by
directly picking per-cpu `overflow_stack` and gets rid of `shadow_stack`.
Following are the changes in this patch
- Defines an asm macro to obtain per-cpu symbols in destination
register.
- In entry.S, when overflow is detected, per-cpu overflow stack is
located using per-cpu asm macro. Computing per-cpu symbol requires
a temporary register. x31 is saved away into CSR_SCRATCH
(CSR_SCRATCH is anyways zero since we're in kernel).
Please see Links for additional relevant disccussion and alternative
solution.
Tested by `echo EXHAUST_STACK > /sys/kernel/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT`
Kernel crash log below
Insufficient stack space to handle exception!/debug/provoke-crash/DIRECT
Task stack: [0xff20000010a98000..0xff20000010a9c000]
Overflow stack: [0xff600001f7d98370..0xff600001f7d99370]
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
epc : __memset+0x60/0xfc
ra : recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
epc : ffffffff808de0e4 ra : ffffffff0163a752 sp : ff20000010a97e80
gp : ffffffff815c0330 tp : ff600000820ea280 t0 : ff20000010a97e88
t1 : 000000000000002e t2 : 3233206874706564 s0 : ff20000010a982b0
s1 : 0000000000000012 a0 : ff20000010a97e88 a1 : 0000000000000000
a2 : 0000000000000400 a3 : ff20000010a98288 a4 : 0000000000000000
a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : fffffffffffe43f0 a7 : 00007fffffffffff
s2 : ff20000010a97e88 s3 : ffffffff01644680 s4 : ff20000010a9be90
s5 : ff600000842ba6c0 s6 : 00aaaaaac29e42b0 s7 : 00fffffff0aa3684
s8 : 00aaaaaac2978040 s9 : 0000000000000065 s10: 00ffffff8a7cad10
s11: 00ffffff8a76a4e0 t3 : ffffffff815dbaf4 t4 : ffffffff815dbaf4
t5 : ffffffff815dbab8 t6 : ff20000010a9bb48
status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: ff20000010a97e88 cause: 000000000000000f
Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow
CPU: 1 PID: 205 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.1.0-rc2-00001-g328a1f96f7b9 #34
Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
Call Trace:
[<ffffffff80006754>] dump_backtrace+0x30/0x38
[<ffffffff808de798>] show_stack+0x40/0x4c
[<ffffffff808ea2a8>] dump_stack_lvl+0x44/0x5c
[<ffffffff808ea2d8>] dump_stack+0x18/0x20
[<ffffffff808dec06>] panic+0x126/0x2fe
[<ffffffff800065ea>] walk_stackframe+0x0/0xf0
[<ffffffff0163a752>] recursive_loop+0x48/0xc6 [lkdtm]
SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
---[ end Kernel panic - not syncing: Kernel stack overflow ]--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix use-after-free in smb2_query_info_compound()
The following UAF was triggered when running fstests generic/072 with
KASAN enabled against Windows Server 2022 and mount options
'multichannel,max_channels=2,vers=3.1.1,mfsymlinks,noperm'
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in smb2_query_info_compound+0x423/0x6d0 [cifs]
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888014941048 by task xfs_io/27534
CPU: 0 PID: 27534 Comm: xfs_io Not tainted 6.6.0-rc7 #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS
rel-1.16.2-3-gd478f380-rebuilt.opensuse.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x4a/0x80
print_report+0xcf/0x650
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? __phys_addr+0x46/0x90
kasan_report+0xda/0x110
? smb2_query_info_compound+0x423/0x6d0 [cifs]
? smb2_query_info_compound+0x423/0x6d0 [cifs]
smb2_query_info_compound+0x423/0x6d0 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb2_query_info_compound+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? __stack_depot_save+0x39/0x480
? kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
? kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
? ____kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x170
smb2_queryfs+0xc2/0x2c0 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb2_queryfs+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
smb311_queryfs+0x210/0x220 [cifs]
? __pfx_smb311_queryfs+0x10/0x10 [cifs]
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? __lock_acquire+0x480/0x26c0
? lock_release+0x1ed/0x640
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9b/0x100
cifs_statfs+0x18c/0x4b0 [cifs]
statfs_by_dentry+0x9b/0xf0
fd_statfs+0x4e/0xb0
__do_sys_fstatfs+0x7f/0xe0
? __pfx___do_sys_fstatfs+0x10/0x10
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x136/0x200
? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0x7f
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Allocated by task 27534:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
__kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
open_cached_dir+0x71b/0x1240 [cifs]
smb2_query_info_compound+0x5c3/0x6d0 [cifs]
smb2_queryfs+0xc2/0x2c0 [cifs]
smb311_queryfs+0x210/0x220 [cifs]
cifs_statfs+0x18c/0x4b0 [cifs]
statfs_by_dentry+0x9b/0xf0
fd_statfs+0x4e/0xb0
__do_sys_fstatfs+0x7f/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x90
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6e/0xd8
Freed by task 27534:
kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
kasan_save_free_info+0x2b/0x50
____kasan_slab_free+0x126/0x170
slab_free_freelist_hook+0xd0/0x1e0
__kmem_cache_free+0x9d/0x1b0
open_cached_dir+0xff5/0x1240 [cifs]
smb2_query_info_compound+0x5c3/0x6d0 [cifs]
smb2_queryfs+0xc2/0x2c0 [cifs]
This is a race between open_cached_dir() and cached_dir_lease_break()
where the cache entry for the open directory handle receives a lease
break while creating it. And before returning from open_cached_dir(),
we put the last reference of the new @cfid because of
!@cfid->has_lease.
Besides the UAF, while running xfstests a lot of missed lease breaks
have been noticed in tests that run several concurrent statfs(2) calls
on those cached fids
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test No task to wake, unknown frame...
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test Cmd: 18 Err: 0x0 Flags: 0x1...
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test smb buf 00000000715bfe83 len 108
CIFS: VFS: Dump pending requests:
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test No task to wake, unknown frame...
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test Cmd: 18 Err: 0x0 Flags: 0x1...
CIFS: VFS: \\w22-root1.gandalf.test smb buf 000000005aa7316e len 108
...
To fix both, in open_cached_dir() ensure that @cfid->has_lease is set
right before sending out compounded request so that any potential
lease break will be get processed by demultiplex thread while we're
still caching @cfid. And, if open failed for some reason, re-check
@cfid->has_lease to decide whether or not put lease reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
reiserfs: Avoid touching renamed directory if parent does not change
The VFS will not be locking moved directory if its parent does not
change. Change reiserfs rename code to avoid touching renamed directory
if its parent does not change as without locking that can corrupt the
filesystem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: Avoid touching renamed directory if parent does not change
The VFS will not be locking moved directory if its parent does not
change. Change ocfs2 rename code to avoid touching renamed directory if
its parent does not change as without locking that can corrupt the
filesystem. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/msm/dpu: Add mutex lock in control vblank irq
Add a mutex lock to control vblank irq to synchronize vblank
enable/disable operations happening from different threads to prevent
race conditions while registering/unregistering the vblank irq callback.
v4: -Removed vblank_ctl_lock from dpu_encoder_virt, so it is only a
parameter of dpu_encoder_phys.
-Switch from atomic refcnt to a simple int counter as mutex has
now been added
v3: Mistakenly did not change wording in last version. It is done now.
v2: Slightly changed wording of commit message
Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/571854/ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix accesses to uninit stack slots
Privileged programs are supposed to be able to read uninitialized stack
memory (ever since 6715df8d5) but, before this patch, these accesses
were permitted inconsistently. In particular, accesses were permitted
above state->allocated_stack, but not below it. In other words, if the
stack was already "large enough", the access was permitted, but
otherwise the access was rejected instead of being allowed to "grow the
stack". This undesired rejection was happening in two places:
- in check_stack_slot_within_bounds()
- in check_stack_range_initialized()
This patch arranges for these accesses to be permitted. A bunch of tests
that were relying on the old rejection had to change; all of them were
changed to add also run unprivileged, in which case the old behavior
persists. One tests couldn't be updated - global_func16 - because it
can't run unprivileged for other reasons.
This patch also fixes the tracking of the stack size for variable-offset
reads. This second fix is bundled in the same commit as the first one
because they're inter-related. Before this patch, writes to the stack
using registers containing a variable offset (as opposed to registers
with fixed, known values) were not properly contributing to the
function's needed stack size. As a result, it was possible for a program
to verify, but then to attempt to read out-of-bounds data at runtime
because a too small stack had been allocated for it.
Each function tracks the size of the stack it needs in
bpf_subprog_info.stack_depth, which is maintained by
update_stack_depth(). For regular memory accesses, check_mem_access()
was calling update_state_depth() but it was passing in only the fixed
part of the offset register, ignoring the variable offset. This was
incorrect; the minimum possible value of that register should be used
instead.
This tracking is now fixed by centralizing the tracking of stack size in
grow_stack_state(), and by lifting the calls to grow_stack_state() to
check_stack_access_within_bounds() as suggested by Andrii. The code is
now simpler and more convincingly tracks the correct maximum stack size.
check_stack_range_initialized() can now rely on enough stack having been
allocated for the access; this helps with the fix for the first issue.
A few tests were changed to also check the stack depth computation. The
one that fails without this patch is verifier_var_off:stack_write_priv_vs_unpriv. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid skb access on nf_stolen
When verdict is NF_STOLEN, the skb might have been freed.
When tracing is enabled, this can result in a use-after-free:
1. access to skb->nf_trace
2. access to skb->mark
3. computation of trace id
4. dump of packet payload
To avoid 1, keep a cached copy of skb->nf_trace in the
trace state struct.
Refresh this copy whenever verdict is != STOLEN.
Avoid 2 by skipping skb->mark access if verdict is STOLEN.
3 is avoided by precomputing the trace id.
Only dump the packet when verdict is not "STOLEN". |
| When libcurl uses libssh2 with a hashed `known_hosts` file, an unrelated
initial entry can cause host key validation to report a key *mismatch* as a
*missing* key to the `CURLOPT_SSH_KEYFUNCTION` callback. |
| Enabling `CURLOPT_CRLF` causes curl to advertise the raw input byte count in
the `IMAP APPEND {N}` literal while transmitting line-ending expanded data.
The server reads only $N$ bytes for the payload, causing the remaining
overflow bytes to be interpreted and executed as pipelined IMAP commands
within the authenticated session. |
| An authenticated HTTPS origin can supply an HSTS `max-age` value that the
parser accepts, but time serialization later fails to process. On 64-bit
systems, extreme max-age values compute an absolute expiry within standard
time integer limits that exceeds calendar time structure bounds. During cache
saves, the original HSTS file is truncated before writing a temporary
replacement; when serialization fails, the temporary file is deleted, leaving
an empty or partial cache. Because the save error is silently ignored during
cleanup, curl exits successfully despite the data loss. |
| Importing a `includeSubDomains` parent HSTS entry before a longer-lived child
entry, silently drops the child. Consequently, when the parent expires, the
child's valid HSTS policy is lost, causing curl to issue unencrypted HTTP
requests rather than upgrading to HTTPS. |
| libcurl's connection cache match function never considers the automatic client
certificate option, so a cached, already authenticated Schannel connection can
be handed to a transfer that got redirected to a different origin, even though
the code explicitly switched off the auto client cert option for that transfer
to prevent exactly this. |
| NLTK through 3.10.3 contains a path traversal vulnerability in model-artifact APIs that bypass pathsec enforcement by using raw file operations on caller-controlled paths. Attackers can read or write files outside allowed sandbox roots through TransitionParser, AveragedPerceptron, PerceptronTagger, and maxent parameter APIs when pathsec is enabled. |
| Cpanel::JSON::XS versions before 4.80 for Perl use the parent interpreter's scalars from a parser object cloned into a new ithread.
A parser object holds its callbacks and its incremental parse buffer as raw scalar pointers. When a thread is created, these are copied into the new interpreter unchanged, so the child's parser uses, and later frees, scalars that belong to the parent and may already have been freed there.
A parser created before a thread starts and used inside it can call freed callbacks, corrupt reference counts and crash the process. |
| Cpanel::JSON::XS versions from 4.20 before 4.80 for Perl write out of bounds when a tied or shared hash grows during canonical encoding in encode_hv.
With canonical, the keys of a tied or threads::shared hash are counted before a second pass collects them for sorting. The encoder uses a fixed 64-entry stack array or, for larger counts, a heap array sized from the first pass. If the second pass exceeds that capacity, entries are written out of bounds before the counts are compared.
This corrupts stack or heap memory and can crash the process. |
| A vulnerability has been found in the CPython `venv` module and CLI where path names provided when creating a virtual environment were not quoted properly, allowing the creator to inject commands into virtual environment "activation" scripts (ie "source venv/bin/activate"). This means that attacker-controlled virtual environments are able to run commands when the virtual environment is activated. Virtual environments which are not created by an attacker or which aren't activated before being used (ie "./venv/bin/python") are not affected. |
