| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Race condition in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Race condition in the JavaScript Engine component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 153.1, Thunderbird 154, and Thunderbird 153.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: alb: re-check primary_is_promisc under RTNL in bond_alb_monitor
bond_alb_monitor() reads primary_is_promisc under RCU, then drops RCU and
takes RTNL via rtnl_trylock() before undoing the promiscuity it set on the
active slave. In that window the active slave can change under RTNL
(RTM_DELLINK -> __bond_release_one() -> bond_alb_handle_active_change()),
which already drops the promiscuity and clears primary_is_promisc. The
monitor still acts on the stale decision: if the slave was removed with no
failover, curr_active_slave is now NULL and the deref faults; if it failed
over, the stale dev_set_promiscuity(-1) underflows the new slave's
promiscuity counter and pins it in IFF_PROMISC.
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address ...
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
Workqueue: b42 bond_alb_monitor
RIP: 0010:bond_alb_monitor (drivers/net/bonding/bond_alb.c:1600)
process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3322)
worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3486)
kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)
ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)
Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception
Re-check primary_is_promisc (and curr_active_slave) after taking RTNL so
the monitor only undoes an increment it still owns. The other bonding
monitors already re-read state under RTNL in their commit phase
(bond_miimon_commit/bond_ab_arp_commit); bond_alb_monitor() was the only
one acting on the pre-trylock decision. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix recv-recv race of completed call
If a call receives an event (such as incoming data), the call gets placed
on the socket's queue and a thread in recvmsg can be awakened to go and
process it. Once the thread has picked up the call off of the queue,
further events will cause it to be requeued, and once the socket lock is
dropped (recvmsg uses call->user_mutex to allow the socket to be used in
parallel), a second thread can come in and its recvmsg can pop the call off
the socket queue again.
In such a case, the first thread will be receiving stuff from the call and
the second thread will be blocked on call->user_mutex. The first thread
can, at this point, process both the event that it picked call for and the
event that the second thread picked the call for and may see the call
terminate - in which case the call will be "released", decoupling the call
from the user call ID assigned to it (RXRPC_USER_CALL_ID in the control
message).
The first thread will return okay, but then the second thread will wake up
holding the user_mutex and, if it sees that the call has been released by
the first thread, it will BUG thusly:
kernel BUG at net/rxrpc/recvmsg.c:474!
Fix this by just dequeuing the call and ignoring it if it is seen to be
already released. We can't tell userspace about it anyway as the user call
ID has become stale. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
futex: Prevent robust futex exit race some more
A robust futex unlock stores 0 over the whole futex value - wiping
FUTEX_WAITERS - and wakes a single waiter. That wakeup is a one-shot
notification: the protocol relies on its recipient to either acquire the
futex (and eventually unlock while aware of the remaining contention) or
re-arm FUTEX_WAITERS before sleeping again. If the woken waiter is killed
before it can do either, the kernel must jump in and wake the next task
down the line.
This is a known complication of the futex protocol with a previous
partial fix in commit ca16d5bee598 ("futex: Prevent robust futex exit
race"). Unfortunately, that fix is insufficient.
If a third task re-acquired the futex through the uncontended fast
path in the meantime, the notification is lost: robust exit processing
sees that it is owned by another task and does nothing, while the new
owner sees no FUTEX_WAITERS when it unlocks and wakes nobody.
The remaining waiters sleep forever behind a free futex:
A owns the futex, B and C sleep in FUTEX_WAIT
uval == A | FUTEX_WAITERS
A robust unlock: store 0, FUTEX_WAKE(1) wakes B
uval == 0
D fast path acquire: cmpxchg(0 -> D)
uval == D, no FUTEX_WAITERS
B killed before acting on the wakeup
B exit walk, pending op: owner D != B -> no action
D unlock: no FUTEX_WAITERS -> no wake
C sleeps forever
This is clearly a shortcoming in the implementation, which fails to keep
the FUTEX_WAITERS bit consistent.
Work around this by augmenting the robust list exit processing to also
perform the extra wakeup if the futex word is owned by another thread but
FUTEX_WAITERS is not set.
This does not fix the problem of a non-contended take over/release and free
sequence, which has been discussed for years and has been addressed by
commit 3ca9595d9fb6 ("futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes") and
subsequent changes, but failed to take the problem described above into
account.
A more complete solution which is based on the in kernel unlock of
contended robust futexes has been discussed in the context of this change
and should show up in mainline sooner than later.
[ tglx: Amend change log slightly and fixup coding style ] |
| A race condition was addressed with improved handling of symbolic links. This issue is fixed in iOS 18.7.5 and iPadOS 18.7.5, iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, macOS Sequoia 15.7.4, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, macOS Tahoe 26.3, visionOS 26.3. A shortcut may be able to bypass sandbox restrictions. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved state handling. This issue is fixed in iOS 26.3 and iPadOS 26.3, macOS Sequoia 15.7.4, macOS Sonoma 14.8.4, macOS Tahoe 26.3, tvOS 26.3, visionOS 26.3, watchOS 26.3. An app may be able to gain root privileges. |
| A race condition was addressed with improved state handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.4. An app may be able to elevate privileges. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| A memory corruption vulnerability was addressed with improved locking. This issue is fixed in Safari 26.6.1, iOS 18.7.10 and iPadOS 18.7.10, iOS 26.6.1 and iPadOS 26.6.1, macOS Tahoe 26.6.2. Processing maliciously crafted web content may lead to an unexpected Safari crash. |
| Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in Windows Device Health Attestation (DHA) allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write
A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file
release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which
triggers the uaf reported in [1].
Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1
==== ====
vfs_rmdir()
kernfs_iop_rmdir()
cgroup_rmdir()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_destroy_locked()
cgroup_addrm_files()
cgroup_rm_file()
kernfs_remove_by_name()
kernfs_remove_by_name_ns()
vfs_write() __kernfs_remove()
new_sync_write() kernfs_drain()
kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files()
cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file()
pressure_write() cgroup_file_release()
ctx = of->priv;
kfree(ctx);
of->priv = NULL;
cgroup_kn_unlock()
cgroup_kn_lock_live()
cgroup_get(cgrp)
cgroup_kn_unlock()
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv
The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards
the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release().
However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write()
are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently,
if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the
ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf
vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.
Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the
cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths
involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition
occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().
And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing
the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion
process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv
pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to
retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn
lock has been successfully acquired.
In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live()
but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of
race condition:
CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0
=========================== =============================
kernfs_fop_write_iter()
kernfs_get_active_of(of)
pressure_write()
cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure)
cgroup_tryget(cgrp)
kernfs_break_active_protection(kn)
... blocks on cgroup_mutex
cgroup_pressure_write()
cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure)
cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false)
kernfs_show(false)
kernfs_drain_open_files()
cgroup_file_release(of)
kfree(ctx)
of->priv = NULL
cgroup_kn_unlock()
... acquires cgroup_mutex
ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL
if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference
Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure
write needs to check for this.
Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original
explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is
because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a
cgroup get/put operation.
[1]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
Call Trace:
pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011
cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:43
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
qede: sync udp_tunnel ports outside qede_lock in the recovery path
A TX timeout on a qede NIC that has VXLAN/GENEVE tunnel ports
configured wedges the rtnetlink control plane of the whole machine:
NETDEV WATCHDOG: ens6f1 (qede): transmit queue 2 timed out 10226 ms
[qede_tx_timeout:586(ens6f1)]TX timeout on queue 2!
[qede_recovery_handler:2665(ens6f0)]Starting a recovery process
The recovery path deadlocks on the driver's own mutex:
qede_sp_task
rtnl_lock()
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- taken
qede_recovery_handler
qede_load
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf
__udp_tunnel_nic_device_sync
info->sync_table == qede_udp_tunnel_sync
mutex_lock(&edev->qede_lock) <- same task: deadlock
The mutex is not recursive, so the kworker blocks on itself with
rtnl_lock held, and neither lock is ever released. Every task that
calls rtnl_lock() afterwards (ip, ovs-vswitchd, lldpad, IPv6
addrconf, sshd) blocks forever while the node still answers ping.
In a vmcore from an affected production node rtnl_mutex.owner
decodes to the very kworker blocked at the innermost mutex_lock()
above.
Re-sync the tunnel ports from qede_sp_task() after the internal lock
is dropped, still under rtnl_lock as the udp_tunnel API requires.
This mirrors qede_open(), which calls udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf()
under rtnl without the internal lock.
qede_recovery_handler() now returns whether it has successfully
reloaded an open device, and the caller re-syncs the ports only in
that case. This keeps the old gating exactly: a device that was down
or a failed recovery returns false, as those paths never reached the
udp_tunnel_nic_reset_ntf() call before either.
This was the only user of the qede_lock()/qede_unlock() helpers, so
remove them. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job
The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are
handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete,
without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data
Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool.
While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread
through branches the binner generated during the current job, the
TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the
hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the "Auto-initialise Tile
State Data Array" flag in the tile binning mode configuration, the
PTB demonstrably still acts on stale tile state left by the slot's
previous user: the binner ends up creating invalid command streams
with invalid primitive streams and branches, which can cause GPU hangs
as observed in [1][2].
Zero the TSDA when the job's binning slot is configured. This clears
48 bytes per tile (~24KB for a 1080p frame) in the submission path, and
guarantees the PTB never sees another job's tile state.
The tile count is only checked for being non-zero today, so the 8-bit
fields it comes from can describe a tile state array almost six times
larger than the slot it has to live in. Bound it before the slot is
handed out, since such size decides how much of the slot is left for
the tile alloc pool. |
| Race condition, use-after-free in the Graphics component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 154, Firefox ESR 115.39, Firefox ESR 140.14, Firefox ESR 153.1, Thunderbird 154, Thunderbird 140.14, and Thunderbird 153.1. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
can: bcm: extend bcm_tx_lock usage for data and timer updates
Stage new CAN frame content for an existing tx op into a kmalloc()'d
buffer and validate it there, mirroring the approach already used in
bcm_rx_setup(). Only copy the validated data into op->frames while
holding op->bcm_tx_lock, so bcm_can_tx() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler()
can no longer observe a partially updated or unvalidated frame.
Add a missing error path for memcpy_from_msg() when copying CAN frame
data from userspace.
Also move the kt_ival1/kt_ival2/ival1/ival2 updates in bcm_tx_setup()
under op->bcm_tx_lock, and read kt_ival1/kt_ival2/count under the same
lock in bcm_tx_set_expiry() and bcm_tx_timeout_handler(), closing the
torn 64-bit ktime_t read on 32-bit platforms. |
| An elevation of privilege vulnerability exists in Windows Error Reporting (WER) when WER handles and executes files. The vulnerability could allow elevation of privilege if an attacker can successfully exploit it.
An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain greater access to sensitive information and system functionality. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker could run a specially crafted application.
The security update addresses the vulnerability by correcting the way that WER handles and executes files. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of
an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.
This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit
cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited
commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and
reintroduced the same issue.
The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without
interacting with GC.
Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is
close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.
The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from
sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()
for sk-A and sk-B.
GC thread User thread
--------- -----------
unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)
-> true <------.
\
`------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)
invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2
close(sk-B)
-> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1
unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)
-> true
Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B
recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the
same as the number of its inflight fds.
However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,
which invalidates the previous evaluation.
At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,
and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()
releases one refcount by the former.
Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.
One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),
but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.
The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent
close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with
the dead SCC detection.
When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.
If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just
give up garbage-collecting the SCC.
Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with
a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.
Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let
it defer the SCC to the next run.
This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can
avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.
Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is
detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from
abusive MSG_PEEK calls. |
| Gotenberg is a Docker-powered stateless API for PDF files. From 8.10.0 until 8.33.0, the newContext function in pkg/modules/api/context.go starts one errgroup.Go goroutine for each multipart downloadFrom entry and allows those goroutines to concurrently write to the shared ctx.files, ctx.diskToOriginal, and ctx.filesByField maps and slices. Go maps and slices are not safe for concurrent mutation, so a crafted multipart request containing many downloadFrom entries can trigger a data race and terminate the process with a fatal concurrent map writes runtime error. The default configuration enables downloadFrom and disables authentication, allowing an unauthenticated remote attacker to crash an exposed conversion service and cause a denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 8.33.0. |
| When typing in a password under certain conditions, a race may have occured where the InputContext was not being correctly set for the input field, resulting in the typed password being saved to the keyboard dictionary. This vulnerability affects Firefox for Android < 80. |
