| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref
l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan->conn. If
the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending,
chan->conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer
worker attempts to lock conn->lock:
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83
|
| CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full)
| Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
| Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout
| Call Trace:
| <TASK>
| instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline]
| atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline]
| __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline]
| mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318
| l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422
| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
| </TASK>
|
| Allocated by task 320:
| l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075
| l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452
| hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline]
| hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760
| hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline]
| hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847
| hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040
| process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline]
| process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409
| worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490
| kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436
| ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158
| ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245
|
| Freed by task 322:
| hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline]
| hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736
| hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405
| hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline]
| hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679
| vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690
| __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510
| task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233
| get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810
| arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337
| __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline]
| exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98
| do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100
| entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
|
| The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400
| which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512
| The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of
| freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600)
Fix it by having chan->conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via
l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and
releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn
remains alive as long as the channel exists.
A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the ch
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL
Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on
double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is
KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But
KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same
freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too:
SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets
the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock()
worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s
the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes
the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the
cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on
conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock
pointing at the freed file_lock.
A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the
KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so
smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same
use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block
__locks_delete_block
locks_delete_block
ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock
smb2_remove_blocked_lock
smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn
handle_ksmbd_work
Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock
Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit)
... cache file_lock_cache of size 192
Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with
KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is
silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger.
Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal
states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees
the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE
so any non-active work is skipped. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov()
The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a
raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently,
adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without
stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A
concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference
freed memory.
This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0
Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/...
Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat]
Call Trace:
kasan_report+0x119/0x140
mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0
adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat]
adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat]
adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat]
process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0
worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30
kthread+0x326/0x410
ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670
Add a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker
processing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag
atomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside
adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE
cluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before
tearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes
before vf_info is destroyed.
Introduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and
unmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is
re-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition
atomically on both the enable and disable paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc
krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and
rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL
completion callback and treat any negative return from
crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to
kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an
async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer
is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the
worker dereferences the freed slab on completion.
KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend
bound to krb5->encrypt_name:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7
The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async
instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing
crypto_wait_req() through every call site.
Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and
net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to
the krb5 enctype name. |
| Use after free in TabStrip in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via UI Interaction. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| Use after free in WebRTC in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Medium) |
| Use after free in Browser in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker who had compromised the renderer process to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| Use after free in Proxy in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.75 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code outside the sandbox via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: High) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range()
map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via
perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are
serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event.
Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race
rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows:
CPU 0 CPU 1
===== =====
rb_alloc_aux() map_range()
[1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0]
[2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++
[3]: perf_mmap_to_page()
returns rb->aux_pages[0]
[4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP
[5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1
munmap the page
[6]: free rb->aux_pages[0]
Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a
mapping to a freed physical frame.
Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
spi: fsl-lpspi: terminate the RX channel on TX prepare failure path
When dmaengine_prep_slave_sg() fails for the TX channel, the error path
terminates the TX DMA channel but leaves the RX channel running. Since
the RX channel was already submitted and issued prior to preparing
the TX descriptor, returning -EINVAL causes the SPI core to unmap the
DMA buffers while the RX DMA engine continues writing to them, leading
to potential memory corruption or use-after-free.
Terminate the RX channel before returning on the TX prepare failure path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: qat - protect service table iterations with service_lock
The service_table list is protected by service_lock when entries are
added or removed (in adf_service_add() and adf_service_remove()), but
several functions iterate over the list without holding this lock.
A concurrent adf_service_register() or adf_service_unregister() call
could modify the list during traversal, leading to list corruption or
a use-after-free.
Fix this by holding service_lock across all list_for_each_entry()
iterations of service_table in adf_dev_init(), adf_dev_start(),
adf_dev_stop(), adf_dev_shutdown(), adf_dev_restarting_notify(),
adf_dev_restarted_notify(), and adf_error_notifier().
The lock ordering is safe: callers of the static helpers (adf_dev_up()
and adf_dev_down()) acquire state_lock before service_lock, and no
event_hld callback or service_lock holder ever acquires state_lock in
the reverse order. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: udc: Fix use-after-free in gadget_match_driver
The udc structure acts as the management structure for the gadget,
but their lifecycles are decoupled. A race condition exists where
usb_del_gadget() frees the udc memory (e.g., via mode-switch work)
while gadget_match_driver() concurrently accesses the freed udc memory
(e.g., via configfs), causing a Use-After-Free (UAF) that triggers a
NULL pointer dereference when the freed memory is zeroed:
[39430.908615][ T1171] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[39430.911397][ T1171] pc : __pi_strcmp+0x20/0x140
[39430.911441][ T1171] lr : gadget_match_driver+0x34/0x60
...
[39430.911890][ T1171] usb_gadget_register_driver_owner+0x50/0xf8
[39430.911910][ T1171] gadget_dev_desc_UDC_store+0xf4/0x140
[39430.931308][ T1171] configfs_write_iter+0xec/0x134
[39430.957058][ T1171] Workqueue: events_freezable __dwc3_set_mode
[39430.957287][ T1171] dwc3_gadget_exit+0x34/0x8c
[39430.957304][ T1171] __dwc3_set_mode+0xc0/0x664
Fix this by ensuring the udc structure remains allocated until the
gadget is released. To achieve this, introduce a new
usb_gadget_release() routine to the core. When the gadget is added,
usb_add_gadget() stores the gadget's release routine in the udc
structure and takes a reference to the udc. When the gadget is
released, usb_gadget_release() drops the reference to the udc and
then calls the gadget's release routine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: free iso schedules on failed submit
EHCI and FOTG210 isochronous submits build an ehci_iso_sched before
linking the URB to the endpoint queue, and keep the staged schedule in
urb->hcpriv until iso_stream_schedule() and the link helpers consume it.
If the controller is no longer accessible, or usb_hcd_link_urb_to_ep()
fails, submit jumps to done_not_linked before that handoff happens and
leaks the staged schedule still attached to urb->hcpriv.
Free the staged schedule from done_not_linked when submit fails before
the URB is linked and clear urb->hcpriv after the free.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing
v6.13-rc1. The tool is still under development and is not yet publicly
available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1.1.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have an
EHCI host controller with a USB isochronous device to test with, no
runtime testing was able to be performed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Allow LPM map access from sleepable BPF programs
trie_lookup_elem() annotates its rcu_dereference_check() walks with
only rcu_read_lock_bh_held(). Because rcu_dereference_check(p, c)
resolves to "c || rcu_read_lock_held()", this passes for XDP/NAPI and
classic RCU readers but fails for sleepable BPF programs, which enter
via __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable() and hold only rcu_read_lock_trace().
trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem() have the same problem in a
different form: they walk the trie with plain rcu_dereference(), which
asserts rcu_read_lock_held() unconditionally. Both are reachable from
sleepable BPF programs via the bpf_map_update_elem / bpf_map_delete_elem
helpers, and from the syscall path under classic rcu_read_lock(). In
the writer paths the trie is actually protected by trie->lock (an
rqspinlock taken across the walk); we never relied on the RCU read-side
lock to keep nodes alive there.
A sleepable LSM hook that ends up touching an LPM trie therefore
triggers lockdep on debug kernels:
=============================
WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
7.1.0-... Tainted: G E
-----------------------------
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:249 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
1 lock held by net_tests/540:
#0: (rcu_tasks_trace_srcu_struct){....}-{0:0},
at: __bpf_prog_enter_sleepable+0x26/0x280
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl
lockdep_rcu_suspicious
trie_lookup_elem
bpf_prog_..._enforce_security_socket_connect
bpf_trampoline_...
security_socket_connect
__sys_connect
do_syscall_64
This is lockdep-only -- no UAF, since Tasks Trace RCU does serialize
against the trie's reclaim path -- but it spams the console once per
distinct callsite on every debug kernel running a sleepable BPF LSM
that touches an LPM trie, which is increasingly common.
For the lookup path, switch the rcu_dereference_check() annotation
from rcu_read_lock_bh_held() to bpf_rcu_lock_held(), which accepts all
three contexts (classic, BH, Tasks Trace). Other map types already
follow this convention.
For trie_update_elem() and trie_delete_elem(), annotate the walks as
rcu_dereference_protected(*p, 1) -- matching trie_free() in the same
file -- since trie->lock is held across the walk. rqspinlock has no
lockdep_map, so the predicate degenerates to '1' rather than
lockdep_is_held(&trie->lock); the protection is real but not
machine-verifiable. trie_get_next_key() also uses bare
rcu_dereference() but is reachable only from the BPF syscall, which
holds classic rcu_read_lock() before dispatching, so it is left
untouched. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: legousbtower: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: iowarrior: fix use-after-free on disconnect
Submitted write URBs are not stopped on close() and therefore need to be
stopped unconditionally on disconnect() to avoid use-after-free in the
completion handler. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: ldusb: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: idmouse: fix use-after-free on disconnect race
mutex_unlock() may access the mutex structure after releasing the lock
and therefore cannot be used to manage lifetime of objects directly
(unlike spinlocks and refcounts). [1][2]
Use a kref to release the driver data to avoid use-after-free in
mutex_unlock() when release() races with disconnect().
[1] a51749ab34d9 ("locking/mutex: Document that mutex_unlock() is
non-atomic")
[2] 2b9d9e0a9ba0 ("locking/mutex: Clarify that mutex_unlock(), and most
other sleeping locks, can still use the lock object
after it's unlocked") |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: loongson - Remove broken and unused loongson-rng
The loongson-rng rng_alg has several vulnerabilities, including not
providing forward security, and a use-after-free bug due to the use of
wait_for_completion_interruptible().
Meanwhile, the rng_alg framework doesn't really have any purpose in the
first place other than to access the software algorithms crypto/drbg.c
and crypto/jitterentropy.c. Hardware-specific rng_algs have no
in-kernel user, and unlike hwrng there's no feed into the actual Linux
RNG. As such, there's really no point to this code. There are of
course other rng_alg drivers that are similarly unused, but they're
similarly in the process of being phased out, e.g.
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529193648.18172-1-ebiggers@kernel.org and
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529220430.34135-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Given that, there's no point in fixing forward these vulnerabilities,
and it makes much more sense to simply roll back the addition of this
driver. If this platform provides TRNG (not PRNG) functionality, it
could make sense to add a hwrng driver, but it would be quite different. |
