| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring
The fuse-io-uring transport copies req->in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req->out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:
usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
'fuse_request' (offset 56, size 40)!
kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
Call Trace:
__check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
__check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
__do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)
Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: iaa - unmap dst before software fallback on decompress
On a hardware analytics error, decompress retries through the software
fallback, which writes req->dst with the CPU while it is still mapped
DMA_FROM_DEVICE. With SWIOTLB active the later dma_unmap_sg() copies the
stale bounce buffer over req->dst, corrupting the result.
Unmap before the fallback runs. The async path unmaps inline; the sync
path signals the retry with -EAGAIN so iaa_comp_adecompress() runs the
fallback after unmapping. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mwifiex: Detach sync cmd buffer on interrupted wait
mwifiex synchronous commands keep the caller-provided data buffer in
cmd_node->data_buf. Several callers pass stack-allocated objects there.
If wait_event_interruptible_timeout() is interrupted, the caller can
return and release that stack object while the firmware command is still
the current command. A late firmware response then reaches the normal
response handler, which can copy data through cmd_node->data_buf into the
stale stack address.
This fixes a stack corruption observed during repeated association and
disassociation cycles. The panic trace showed the command wait being
interrupted immediately before a bad pointer dereference:
cmd_wait_q terminated: -512
Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 002c583837384662
Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted
...
Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK
The fault address decodes as little-endian ASCII:
0x002c583837384662 -> "bF878X,\0"
which is a fragment of the VERSION_EXT firmware string exposed as
debugfs "verext":
w8997o-V4, RF878X, FP92, 16.92.21.p153.7
The same runs also showed corrupted control data containing:
0x2400372e333531 -> "153.7\0$"
which is the tail of the same VERSION_EXT string. This points at a late
VERSION_EXT response writing through a stale stack-backed data_buf after
the interrupted wait returned.
After cancelling pending commands on an interrupted or timed-out wait,
detach the caller-owned data buffer from the still-current command. This
preserves the existing command cancellation behaviour while preventing a
late response from writing through a pointer whose lifetime ended with the
waiting caller.
Tested on an i.MX8MP board using an 88W8997. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8192du: check QoS TID before indexing tids
rtl92du_tx_fill_desc() uses ieee80211_get_tid() to read the QoS TID
from the 802.11 header and then uses it as an index into
sta_entry->tids[]. ieee80211_get_tid() returns the low 4-bit QoS TID
value, so the result can be in the range 0..15.
rtlwifi only allocates MAX_TID_COUNT entries for sta_entry->tids[], and
MAX_TID_COUNT is 9. A QoS TID greater than 8 therefore indexes past the
aggregation state array. Keep the default RTL_AGG_STOP state for
out-of-range TIDs, matching rtl92cu_tx_fill_desc().
This issue was detected by our static analysis tool and confirmed by
manual audit. UBSAN validation for the same bug pattern reports an
array-index-out-of-bounds access with index 10 for type
'rtl_tid_data [9]'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtlwifi: rtl8192du: Fix possible memory leak in rtl92du_init_sw_vars()
The memory allocated inside rtl92du_init_shared_data() is not freed in
any of the subsequent error paths in rtl92du_init_sw_vars().
Fix that by adding a call to rtl92du_deinit_shared_data() in the error
path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: Fix potential memory leak in rtw_txq_push_skb()
The skb passed to the rtw_hci_tx_write() is expected to be freed when
the function fails, but the error path in rtw_txq_push_skb() does not
free the skb before returning. This can lead to a memory leak in
rtw_txq_push() where a dequeued skb is passed to rtw_txq_push_skb(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: pci: fix resource leak on failed NAPI setup
rtw_pci_probe() allocates PCI resources through
rtw_pci_setup_resource() before it sets up NAPI. If
rtw_pci_napi_init() fails, the error path jumps straight to
err_pci_declaim and skips rtw_pci_destroy(), leaving the PCI
resources allocated by rtw_pci_setup_resource() behind.
Add a dedicated cleanup label for the NAPI setup failure path so probe
destroys the PCI resources.
The bug was first flagged by an experimental analysis tool we are
developing for kernel memory-management bugs while analyzing current
mainline kernels. The tool is still under development and is not yet
publicly available. Manual inspection confirms that the bug is still
present in v7.1-rc7.
An x86_64 allyesconfig build showed no new warnings. As we do not have a
suitable rtw88 PCI board to test with, no runtime testing was able to be
performed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw89: pci: add .shutdown callback to stop rfkill polling on reboot
Since the hardware rfkill polling was introduced, arm64 platforms can
panic with an asynchronous SError during warm reboot:
SError Interrupt on CPU8, code 0x00000000be000011 -- SError
Workqueue: events_power_efficient rfkill_poll [rfkill]
rtw89_pci_ops_read8+0x94/0x160 [rtw89_pci]
rtw89_core_rfkill_poll+0x50/0x1e0 [rtw89_core]
rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x68 [rtw89_core]
ieee80211_rfkill_poll+0x3c/0x70 [mac80211]
cfg80211_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x2a0 [cfg80211]
rfkill_poll+0x30/0x88 [rfkill]
Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt
On the reboot path the kernel only runs device_shutdown(), which calls
each driver's .shutdown callback; .remove is not invoked. The rtw89 PCI
driver had no .shutdown callback, so nothing stopped the rfkill polling
work while the platform was tearing the PCIe link down. Once the link
is gone, the next MMIO read from the poll handler targets a
non-responding device and is reported as a fatal asynchronous SError on
arm64.
Add rtw89_pci_shutdown(), wired to all rtw89 PCI device drivers, which
sets a new RTW89_FLAG_SHUTDOWN flag (mirroring the USB
RTW89_FLAG_UNPLUGGED pattern). When the flag is set,
rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll() returns early, so no MMIO read is issued to the
chip after shutdown begins and the SError no longer occurs.
This does not call the full .remove path from .shutdown, to keep the
shutdown handler minimal and avoid running the non-idempotent teardown
twice. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7615: avoid waiting for mac work under the mt76 mutex
mt7615_suspend() acquired the mt76 mutex and then called
cancel_delayed_work_sync() on mac_work. mt7615_mac_work() acquires the
same mutex via mt7615_mutex_acquire() at the top of the worker, so if
mac_work is already running and blocked on the mutex, the suspend path
deadlocks waiting for the work it holds the mutex against.
Flush scan_work and mac_work before taking the mutex, matching the
suspend paths in mt7921 and mt7925. scan_work only takes the mt76
spinlock, but moving it keeps the sequence consistent. This also keeps
mac_work from running over an already suspended HIF, which the previous
split (async cancel under the lock, sync cancel after release) would
have allowed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7915: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy
mt7915_mcu_get_eeprom() copies a fixed EFUSE block into the driver's
dev->mt76.eeprom.data buffer at the offset reported by the MCU response
(res->addr, a device-controlled __le32) without checking it against the
buffer size. A malicious or malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary
address and drive a 16-byte out-of-bounds write past eeprom.data.
Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data
before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested
in-bounds offset are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: cancel mlo_pm_work on stop
mt7925 queues mlo_pm_work with a 5 second delay during multi-link
power-save setup and never cancels it on the stop path. If the device is
torn down inside that window, the work outlives the teardown and its timer
fires afterwards, trying to queue onto the workqueue that is already gone:
workqueue: cannot queue mt7925_mlo_pm_work [mt7925_common] on wq phy0
WARNING: kernel/workqueue.c:2283 at __queue_work+0x59/0xa0, CPU#1: swapper/1/0
call_timer_fn+0x2a/0x140
__run_timers+0x203/0x330
run_timer_softirq+0x86/0xf0
mt7921 already has its own stop callback, so add one for mt7925 that
cancels the work before calling mt792x_stop(). mt7925_ops backs both the
PCIe and USB drivers, so this covers both. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: bound the device EEPROM address before the EFUSE copy
mt7996_mcu_get_eeprom() derives the destination of the EFUSE/EXT block
copy from the address reported by the MCU response (event->addr, a
device-controlled __le32) and clamps only the copy length, never the
destination offset into dev->mt76.eeprom.data. A malicious or
malfunctioning device can report an arbitrary address and drive an
out-of-bounds write of up to MT7996_EXT_EEPROM_BLOCK_SIZE bytes past
eeprom.data.
Reject a response whose address would place the copy outside eeprom.data
before deriving the destination pointer. Devices that echo the requested
in-bounds offset are unaffected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: fix TX DMA mapping leak for AddBA req frames
mt7996/mt7992 hand the firmware a HW MAC-TXP for AddBA req action frames
(MT_TXD7_MAC_TXD, set in mt7996_mac_write_txwi_80211()), but are otherwise
FW-TXP devices. On tx free mt76_connac_txp_skb_unmap() therefore decodes
the per-frame txp as a struct mt76_connac_fw_txp. For a MAC-TXP the
fw_txp.nbuf byte aliases the AddBA TID word (MT_TXP1_TID_ADDBA), which is
always zero, so the unmap loop runs zero times and the skb DMA mapping in
buf[1] is never unmapped. buf[1].skip_unmap is set unconditionally, so the
generic DMA-ring cleanup skips it as well.
Each AddBA req therefore leaks one TX DMA mapping, roughly one per
(re)association. With WED enabled these mappings are bounced through the
WED swiotlb pool, so under continuous client reconnect churn the pool is
exhausted after ~1-2 days, after which DMA mapping fails for WED, the WiFi
MCU and other on-SoC consumers.
Keep the deferred (token release) unmap that the design relies on, and add
an mt7996-specific txp unmap that inspects MT_TXD7_MAC_TXD and unmaps
buf[1] from the MAC-TXP layout for those frames, delegating to
mt76_connac_txp_skb_unmap() otherwise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7996: validate default EEPROM firmware size
The default EEPROM firmware is parsed and copied as a full EEPROM
without checking its length. A truncated file can make the driver
read beyond the firmware buffer during variant validation or the
fallback copy.
Reject files shorter than MT7996_EEPROM_SIZE before parsing or
copying the firmware. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock/virtio: flush works in dependency order
virtio_vsock_remove() stops the virtqueues and then flushes each work
item before freeing the enclosing virtio_vsock. The current order does
not account for dependencies between those items: tx_work may queue
send_pkt_work, and send_pkt_work may queue rx_work.
In particular, send_pkt_work can set restart_rx and release tx_lock.
The remove path can then stop the queues and flush rx_work before
send_pkt_work queues it. Although the later send_pkt_work flush waits
for that producer to finish, nothing waits for the newly queued rx_work,
so kfree(vsock) can race with it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in
virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888114c2b008 by task kworker/1:1/47
Workqueue: virtio_vsock virtio_transport_rx_work
Call Trace:
virtio_transport_rx_work+0x487/0x4b0
process_one_work+0x688/0x1120
worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10
Allocated by task 1:
virtio_vsock_probe+0xef/0x6b0
Freed by task 84:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
virtio_vsock_remove+0xd1/0x100
Flush the works in producer-to-consumer order. virtio_vsock_vqs_del()
has already disabled the queue callbacks and cleared the run flags, so
after tx_work and send_pkt_work are drained, no source remains that can
queue rx_work after its flush. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
w1: ds28e17: reject an oversize length on an I2C block read
w1_f19_i2c_master_transfer() is the master_xfer for the DS28E17 1-Wire
to I2C bridge. On an I2C_M_RECV_LEN read, it takes the length from the
device. The downstream slave puts a length byte in buf[0]. The driver
then reads that many bytes into buf[1] with w1_f19_i2c_read().
buf[0] is controlled by the device and can be 0 to 255.
w1_f19_i2c_read() only rejects a zero count. The caller buffer is
I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2, so 34 bytes. A length above 32 makes the read
run past it, up to about 222 bytes out of bounds.
The SMBus core does check buf[0] against I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX. That
check runs after master_xfer returns. By then the write is already
done. i2c-algo-bit rejects an oversize length before it copies, and
returns -EPROTO.
Reject a length above I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX at both RECV_LEN sites, the
same way i2c-algo-bit does. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tpm: tpm_i2c_nuvoton: disable IRQ on wait timeout
i2c_nuvoton_wait_for_stat() enables the IRQ before waiting for the
interrupt handler to report a status change. If the wait times out, or is
interrupted before the handler runs, the function returns without
balancing the enable_irq() call.
Disable the IRQ before leaving the failed wait path. Also preserve an
interrupted wait's original error code instead of converting it to
-ETIMEDOUT inside the helper. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sysctl: move the "cad_pid" entry from pid_table[] to kern_reboot_table[]
cad_pid is global, and kill_cad_pid() is only used in the root namespace.
However, due to pid_table_root_permissions(), a non-root user can unshare
pid/user namespaces and modify it from the child namespace. This makes no
sense and is simply wrong.
Move it to kern_reboot_table[] where it logically belongs; this ensures
that only GLOBAL_ROOT_UID can read/modify this sysctl.
Note that this patch doesn't preserve "#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL" around
the "cad_pid"; CONFIG_PROC_SYSCTL selects CONFIG_SYSCTL, so it is always
set when kern_reboot_table[] is compiled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smack: fix cred UAF in smack_file_send_sigiotask()
When inspecting the credentials of another task, objective credentials
(->real_cred, accessed with __task_cred()) must always be used.
Accessing ->cred on a non-current task is forbidden unless that task is
being created or destroyed; a task is allowed to change its own ->cred
pointer with no synchronization, and changing ->cred should only affect the
current syscall.
smack_file_send_sigiotask() was accessing both sets of credentials: First
tsk->cred, then __task_cred(tsk).
Fix it, always access the objective credentials here.
I have tested that this bug can lead to a KASAN-reported UAF of struct cred
in smack_file_send_sigiotask(), and that this fix prevents the race. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
timekeeping: Check the return value of tk_get_aux_ts64 in __do_adjtimex()
If the auxiliary clock is disabled during tk_get_aux_ts64() but is enabled
before tks->clock_valid is checked, then uninitialized stackdata will be
used in the calculations and indirectly leaked to userspace.
The same race window also exists after this change and also for the core
timekeeper. But in these cases the only effect would be incorrect
adjustments and this is userspace's responsibility to avoid this. |
