| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath6kl: clamp assoc request/response lengths before subtracting IE offsets
ath6kl_cfg80211_connect_event() subtracts fixed IE offsets from
assoc_req_len (-= 4) and assoc_resp_len (-= 6), both u8, with no lower
bound. The aggregate check recently added to ath6kl_wmi_connect_event_rx()
bounds the declared lengths from above (their sum must fit the received
event), but an assoc request/response shorter than its fixed offset still
underflows here: the u8 wraps to ~250, and cfg80211_connect_result() /
cfg80211_roamed() then treat that wrapped value as the IE length and copy
that many bytes out of the small assoc_info buffer to user space via
nl80211, disclosing adjacent slab memory.
Clamp both lengths to their offsets before subtracting.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; the
missing lower bound is evident from source. Compile-tested. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/ucma: Lock the handler in ucma_set_ib_path()
ucma_set_ib_path() calls ucma_event_handler() straight from the write()
path, without the handler lock that keeps ctx->file stable while a uevent
is queued. The handler re-reads ctx->file for every dereference:
mutex_lock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file A */
list_add_tail(&uevent->list, &ctx->file->event_list); /* file B */
mutex_unlock(&ctx->file->mut); /* file B */
wake_up_interruptible(&ctx->file->poll_wait); /* file B */
A concurrent ucma_migrate_id() reassigns ctx->file while the SET_OPTION
caller sleeps in mutex_lock(), so the list_add_tail() lands on file B's
event_list while only file A's mutex is held, racing every other user of
that list:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0
Read of size 8 at addr ffff888153c6a418 by task poc_corr/486
Call Trace:
__list_add_valid_or_report+0x1aa/0x1c0
ucma_event_handler+0x1be/0xc00
ucma_set_ib_path+0x45e/0x710
ucma_set_option+0x32e/0x590
ucma_write+0x1f9/0x330
Allocated by task 505:
ucma_write_cm_event+0x1a1/0x660
Freed by task 505:
kfree+0x1da/0x4c0
ucma_get_event+0x5d5/0x7e0
The freed object is a ucma_event that another thread dequeued from file B's
list under file B's mutex. File A's mut is left held on top of that,
wedging its next writer in uninterruptible sleep.
This path needs a bound and address-resolved cm_id, so it requires an RDMA
device to be present.
Take the handler lock around the call. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
regulator: as3722_get_regulator_dt_data: fix premature of_node_put leaving dangling of_node pointer
In as3722_get_regulator_dt_data(), of_get_child_by_name() acquires a
reference on np, which is then assigned to pdev->dev.of_node. The
function immediately calls of_node_put(np), releasing the reference and
leaving pdev->dev.of_node as a dangling pointer.
Remove the of_node_put(np) call to let the device hold the reference. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
orangefs: skip leading spaces before parsing client debug masks
orangefs_prepare_cdm_array() sizes each client debug keyword buffer
with strcspn(cds_head, " "), but then parses the keyword with %s. The
%s conversion skips leading whitespace, while strcspn() does not.
If a client debug entry starts with a space, the allocation can be sized
for an empty keyword while sscanf() copies the following non-empty token.
This can write past the end of the allocated keyword buffer.
Skip leading spaces before computing the keyword length so the allocation
matches the string parsed by sscanf(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: validate rl_used against rl_count in refcount block validator
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() walks the on-disk refcount record array
with:
for (; i < le16_to_cpu(rb->rf_records.rl_used); i++) {
rec = &rb->rf_records.rl_recs[i];
...
rl_recs[] lives in a single metadata block (4096 bytes on the common
configuration), so its real capacity is fixed by
ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(sb) (247 records for a 4K block with the
16-byte ocfs2_refcount_rec). rl_used and rl_count are both read directly
off disk by ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() and are never checked against
that capacity, nor against each other, before any refcount/reflink/CoW
operation walks the array.
A crafted (or corrupted) refcount block with rl_used == 0xffff makes the
loop above walk far past the end of the block, dereferencing rl_recs[i]
for i up to 65534. The resulting index is then handed to the sibling
ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec(), whose insert-shift does:
if (index < le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used))
memmove(&rf_list->rl_recs[index + 1],
&rf_list->rl_recs[index],
(le16_to_cpu(rf_list->rl_used) - index) *
sizeof(struct ocfs2_refcount_rec));
i.e. a memmove() of up to (0xffff - index) * 16 bytes (~1 MiB) from an
offset already past the block. This is reachable from an ordinary reflink
(FICLONE) against a crafted/corrupted ocfs2 image: attaching an extent
whose cpos sorts past every real record in the leaf forces the lookup to
run off the end instead of returning early on a match. The attacker model
is local: CAP_SYS_ADMIN mounting a crafted or corrupted ocfs2 image, or a
raw write to the block device backing an already-mounted ocfs2 filesystem.
ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() already validates the block's ECC,
signature, rf_blkno and rf_fs_generation, but never rl_count/rl_used
against the block's actual on-disk capacity. This is the same class of
gap that ocfs2_validate_extent_block() (fs/ocfs2/alloc.c) already closes
for the sibling extent-list header, which checks both the record capacity
and the "used" bound before any code walks h_list.l_recs[]:
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count) != ocfs2_extent_recs_per_eb(sb)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
if (le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_next_free_rec) >
le16_to_cpu(eb->h_list.l_count)) {
rc = ocfs2_error(...);
goto bail;
}
Add the equivalent pair of checks to ocfs2_validate_refcount_block():
reject a refcount block whose rl_count does not match the fixed per-block
capacity returned by ocfs2_refcount_recs_per_rb(), and reject rl_used >
rl_count. Both checks are skipped when OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL is set,
because in that case the same union bytes hold an ocfs2_extent_list
(rf_list), not the refcount record list (rf_records) -- that layout is
already validated separately by ocfs2_validate_extent_block() when the
referenced extent block is read. This mirrors the existing
"!(rb->rf_flags & OCFS2_REFCOUNT_TREE_FL)" guard used elsewhere in this
file (e.g. ocfs2_get_refcount_rec()) to decide whether rf_records or
rf_list is the live member of the union.
With this in place, a forged rl_used/rl_count is caught at block
validation time (ocfs2_error()), consistent with every other corruption
check in this function, instead of driving an out-of-bounds read in
ocfs2_find_refcount_rec_in_rl() and a subsequent out-of-bounds memmove()
in ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec().
Verified against a crafted image on a v6.19 KASAN (KASAN_GENERIC) build:
replaying the same reflink (FICLONE) reliably hit a KASAN report in
__ocfs2_increase_refcount()/ocfs2_insert_refcount_rec() before this patch,
and triggers no report once ocfs2_validate_refcount_block() rejects the
forged rl_used/rl_count. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
openrisc: fix arbitrary kernel memory access via or1k_atomic syscall
sys_or1k_atomic() (syscall 244 in the "or1k" ABI) takes two user
pointers, v1 and v2, and swaps the words they point to in hand-written
assembly.
l.lwz r29,0(r4)
l.lwz r27,0(r5)
l.sw 0(r4),r27
l.sw 0(r5),r29
The pointers are not checked with access_ok(). The four memory
accesses also have no exception table entries.
A caller passes a kernel address as either pointer, and the syscall
reads from and writes to it directly.
This gives an unprivileged process a kernel read/write primitive. It
overwrites kernel data such as the sys_call_table, gaining code
execution in kernel context.
Check both pointers before entering the critical section. Add fixups
for the four memory accesses so faults on valid but unmapped user
addresses return -EFAULT.
[shorne@gmail.com: fix comment style] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: cros_usbpd-charger: bound the EC-reported port count
cros_usbpd_charger_probe() reads two port counts from the EC and uses
one of them, num_charger_ports, as the loop bound when populating a
fixed-size array:
struct port_data *ports[EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS]; /* 8 entries */
...
for (i = 0; i < charger->num_charger_ports; i++)
charger->ports[charger->num_registered_psy++] = port;
Both num_usbpd_ports (from EC_CMD_USB_PD_PORTS) and num_charger_ports
(from EC_CMD_CHARGE_PORT_COUNT) are u8 values reported by the EC. The
only validation is a sanity check that compares the two EC-reported
values against each other:
if (num_charger_ports < num_usbpd_ports ||
num_charger_ports > num_usbpd_ports + 1)
return -EPROTO;
It never checks either count against EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS, the size of
the ports[] array. A malfunctioning, malicious or compromised EC that
reports num_usbpd_ports == num_charger_ports == N for any N > 8 (for
example both 255) passes this check, and the loop then writes N pointers
into the 8-entry ports[] array embedded in the devm_kzalloc()'d
charger_data, overflowing it by up to 255 - 8 = 247 entries (~1976
bytes): a slab out-of-bounds write.
Reject a port count larger than the ports[] array can hold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: cros_usbpd: Limit port counts to EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS
Currently the cros_usbpd-charger driver probe iterates based on raw
charger port count returned by the embedded controller. The only check
is against the number of USB PD ports which the embedded controller
also defines. A malicious embedded controller could return an inaccurate
port count (up to 255) resulting in an out of bounds write and
subsequent memory corruption.
Update helper functions in cros_usbpd-charger to limit port counts to
EC_USB_PD_MAX_PORTS. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: lp8727: fix use-after-free in lp8727_release_irq()
lp8727_isr_func(), the threaded IRQ handler, is the only caller that arms
pchg->work via schedule_delayed_work(). lp8727_release_irq() currently
cancels the work before freeing the IRQ, so an IRQ delivered in between
can re-arm the work through the threaded handler. After .remove returns
the devm layer frees pchg while lp8727_delayed_func() may still run and
dereference it.
Free the IRQ first so the threaded handler is quiesced and can no longer
queue work, then cancel the delayed work to drain the final generation.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
power: supply: qcom_battmgr: terminate the strings from firmware
The qcom_battmgr_sc8280xp_strcpy() takes a Pascal-style string when the
firmware sends one. Otherwise it copies all BATTMGR_STRING_LEN bytes and
leaves the destination without a terminator.
Those destinations are model_number, serial_number and oem_info, each
BATTMGR_STRING_LEN and declared next to each other. They go out to user
space as val->strval, which power_supply_format_property() prints with
"%s", so a firmware string that fills the whole field makes that read run
into the following members.
Use strscpy() so the copy always terminates, the way the SM8350 path
already does for the same field. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/dasd: Propagate partial completion length across ERP recovery
dasd_default_erp_postaction() copies the timing and device state from
the finished ERP request back to the original request but drops
proc_bytes. A request that was partially completed, an ESE read of a
not-yet-allocated track returns fewer bytes than requested, and then
recovered through the ERP chain loses its partial-completion length.
__dasd_cleanup_cqr() then sees proc_bytes == 0 and completes the whole
request instead of requeueing the remainder, silently returning zeroed
data for the part that was never read.
Carry proc_bytes over to the original request like the other
per-request state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: ISST: Validate level in perf mask ioctls
isst_if_get_perf_level_mask() and isst_if_get_base_freq_mask() use the
user-provided level as an index into perf_levels[] via
_read_pp_level_info() and _read_bf_level_info(), but neither helper
validates it first.
The adjacent level-info helpers reject levels above max_level before
reading the same per-level register block. Add the same bounds checks to
the mask helpers, and reject disabled SST-PP levels in
isst_if_get_perf_level_mask() to match isst_if_get_perf_level_info().
This prevents out-of-bounds reads from the per-level offset table on
invalid ioctl input. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: ISST: Validate socket ID in clos_assoc ioctl
isst_if_clos_assoc() validates the user-supplied socket_id with
'socket_id > topology_max_packages()', but isst_common.sst_inst[] is
allocated with topology_max_packages() entries, so the valid index range
is [0, topology_max_packages()). The '>' comparison lets
socket_id == topology_max_packages() pass and index one entry past the
array.
In addition, isst_common.sst_inst[socket_id] is NULL for an in-range
package that has no bound TPMI SST instance, and the pointer is used
without a NULL check. Both the out-of-bounds entry and the NULL pointer
are then dereferenced by map_partition_power_domain_id() and the
following power_domain_info access.
Reject socket_id >= topology_max_packages() and a NULL sst_inst, matching
the checks already performed by get_instance(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mmc: via-sdmmc: stop card-detect handling on probe failure
request_irq() registers the SD card-detect interrupt and the probe enables
it before mmc_add_host() runs. If mmc_add_host() fails, the error path only
unmaps the registers and returns: the interrupt stays registered, so the
handler keeps running against the host once it is freed. via_sdc_isr()
dereferences sdhost and its MMIO base and schedules carddet_work, which
via_sdc_card_detect() also runs against freed memory through its
container_of() dereference.
Add a probe-error path that disables and frees the interrupt and cancels
carddet_work before unmapping. carddet_work can re-enable the device
interrupt via via_reset_pcictrl(), which restores PCIINTCTRL, so mask it
again after cancelling the work.
This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool and confirmed by
manual code review. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: sensorhub: Bound the EC-reported sensor number
Each EC FIFO event carries an 8-bit sensor number (in->sensor_num).
cros_ec_sensorhub_ring_handler() validates the FIFO event count, the
per-read count and the ring bound, but not the sensor number, which
cros_ec_sensor_ring_process_event() then uses unchecked to index
sensorhub->batch_state[] - allocated with only sensorhub->sensor_num
entries. A sensor number of sensor_num or larger is an out-of-bounds
read and write of batch_state[].
Validate the sensor number in the ring handler, where each event is read
from the EC, and drop a malformed event before it is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix off-by-one write in hp_get_string_from_buffer()
hp_get_string_from_buffer() clamps the converted string length against
the destination buffer size with "size > dst_size", so when the
converted length is exactly equal to dst_size, conv_dst_size is left
at dst_size and the unconditional NUL terminator write
dst[conv_dst_size] = 0;
lands one byte past the destination buffer. This is the same shape of
bug as the previously fixed off-by-one in hp_convert_hexstr_to_str():
the buffer is sized correctly for the content, but the terminator
write is never checked against that size.
Fix by changing the comparison to ">=" so conv_dst_size is always left
with room for the terminator.
All fixed-size destinations that reach this function (path[512],
current_value[512], current_password/current_value[64], and the
per-entry buffers in encodings[][512] and prerequisites[][512]) are
affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers
The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count.
hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then
calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string,
integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a
count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead
of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count
from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an
ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads
->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound
themselves against the length of the name string rather than against
the real number of elements in the package.
This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any
package that has fewer than the type's element count, so a parser only
ever runs on a full package and never reads past it regardless of the
bogus bound.
An upcoming change relaxes that check to accept shorter packages. Once
a parser can receive fewer elements than its per-type count, a bound
taken from the name length no longer reflects the array size, and the
"elem < count" loop conditions and "elem + n >= count" sub-loop guards
read past the end of elements[] - an out-of-bounds heap read.
Forward the validated obj->package.count to every *_package_data()
wrapper so the parsers bound themselves against the real package size.
This does not change behaviour for the packages that enumerate
correctly today and is a prerequisite for accepting shorter packages
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
interconnect: Fix use after free in icc_get() and of_icc_get_by_index()
In of_icc_get_by_index() and icc_get(), if the dynamic allocation for
path->name fails via kasprintf(), the error handling path directly
calls kfree(path) to free the path object and returns an error.
However, prior to this point, path_find() calls path_init(), which
already links the path's requests into the req_list of the respective
interconnect nodes via hlist_add_head(). Directly invoking kfree(path)
leaves dangling pointers in the hlist. A subsequent call to icc_get()
or icc_set_bw() will traverse or modify these corrupted lists, triggering
a slab use afterfree.
KASAN report showing the vulnerability when reproducing via debugfs:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in path_find+0x6f8/0xcfc
Write of size 8 at addr fff000000d43f748 by task sh/1
...
Call trace:
kasan_report+0xac/0xfc
path_find+0x6f8/0xcfc
icc_get+0x148/0x380
icc_get_set+0xf8/0x2d0
...
Freed by task 1:
kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4
icc_get+0x2cc/0x380
icc_get_set+0xf8/0x2d0
Fix this by replacing kfree(path) with the proper teardown function,
icc_put(path), which safely removes the requests from the req_list using
hlist_del() and drops the provider usage references before freeing the
memory.
Additionally, in icc_get(), ensure that the icc_lock mutex is released
prior to calling icc_put(path) to avoid a deadlock, as icc_put()
internally acquires the same lock. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ravb: avoid dereferencing an invalid PTP clock
The PTP clock is unavailable before the first open, so querying its
index can dereference a NULL pointer. Registration failures can also
leave an error pointer in priv->ptp.clock.
Cache the PHC index separately and report -1 while no clock is
registered. Normalize registration errors to NULL and preserve the
static timestamping capabilities. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: unregister the connection before draining the rx tasklet
smc_conn_free() calls smc_ism_unset_conn() only while the link group is
still on its device list, and never sets conn->killed.
smc_lgr_terminate_sched() unlinks the group immediately and defers killing
its connections to a work item, so a connection freed in that window keeps
its smcd->conn[] slot with both gates in smcd_handle_irq() open, and the
device can re-arm the receive tasklet after tasklet_kill() has returned. On
the DMB-nocopy path the ghost send buffer is freed right after that drain,
so the re-armed tasklet dereferences it.
Unregister unconditionally and drain before the detach at both teardown
sites, mirroring rmb_desc, which smc_buf_unuse() releases after the drain.
Clear conn->sndbuf_desc before freeing it as well, so a reader that samples
the pointer cannot get one that is already freed. |