Export limit exceeded: 430281 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.

Export limit exceeded: 430281 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.

Export limit exceeded: 430281 CVEs match your query. Please refine your search to export 10,000 CVEs or fewer.

Search

Search Results (430281 CVEs found)

CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-99691 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.4 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/cluster: unlink socket containers before releasing resources A socket container's node and socket must remain alive while the container is on sock_containers. The debugfs formatter reads sc_node and sc_sock under o2net_debug_lock without taking their references, but sc_kref_release() releases both before taking that lock to unlink the container. With CONFIG_DEBUG_FS enabled, a synchronous sender can retain its last socket-container reference after o2net_disconnect_node() has detached the connection and flushed o2net_wq. The caller runs outside that workqueue. After the sender removes its configfs dependency, node removal can proceed without waiting for the sender's final sc_put(): Sender (final sc_put) Configfs rmdir Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- -------------- o2nm_undepend_item() Drop node item refs o2nm_node_put() [node can be freed] sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_node->nd_name Unlock debug lock sc_node = NULL o2net_debug_del_sc() The earlier socket release has a similar window. The container is still selectable while its socket has been released and sc_sock has not yet been cleared: Sender (final sc_put) Debugfs reader -------------------- -------------- sock_release(sc->sc_sock) [socket can be freed] sc_seq_show() Lock debug lock Read sc_sock->sk fields Unlock debug lock sc_sock = NULL ... o2net_debug_del_sc() Move o2net_debug_del_sc() before releasing either resource. Unlinking under the existing debug lock waits for an active formatter to finish and prevents later readers from selecting the container. This covers both socket fields and node fields, including nd_num in the stats formatter. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in string+0x42b/0x470 Read of size 1 at addr ffff88810f56fc90 by task python3/506 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 506 Comm: python3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 print_report+0xce/0x630 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 string+0x42b/0x470 vsnprintf+0x330/0x1110 seq_printf+0x1a8/0x260 sc_seq_show+0x604/0x9f0 seq_read_iter+0x480/0x1110 seq_read+0x362/0x5a0 full_proxy_read+0x11f/0x180 vfs_read+0x1a0/0xc20 ksys_read+0x111/0x200 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f (User register dump omitted.) </TASK> Allocated by task 497: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x28d/0x610 o2nm_node_group_make_item+0xea/0x1a0 configfs_mkdir+0x762/0xca0 vfs_mkdir+0x399/0x7e0 filename_mkdirat+0x129/0x450 __x64_sys_mkdir+0x70/0xa0 do_syscall_64+0x114/0x620 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f Freed by task 505: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60 __kasan_slab_free+0x5f/0x80 kfree+0x308/0x580 config_item_cleanup+0x14b/0x230 config_item_put+0x79/0x90 sc_put+0x454/0x6e0 o2net_send_message_vec+0x63d/0x1560 o2net_send_message+0xa6/0xe0 validation_send_write+0x17f/0x1d0 full_proxy_write+0x11f/0x180 vfs_write+0x25a/0x1010 ksys_write+ ---truncated---
CVE-2026-99692 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.1 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: stop recovery before shutting down local allocators Recovery completion needs the local allocators until it has finished reclaiming a failed node's allocation window and truncate log. During unmount, quota recovery is stopped first, but that leaves recovery_state at OCFS2_REC_QUOTA_DISABLED. New non-quota recovery can still start. ocfs2_truncate_log_shutdown() drains existing completion work and releases osb_tl_bh before ocfs2_recovery_exit() closes that publication path: Unmount Recovery ------- -------- stop quota recovery; disable quotas truncate_log_shutdown() flush existing completion work recover another failed node queue completion flush local log; release buffer complete_truncate_log_recovery() use released osb_tl_bh recovery_exit(): disable and drain An extra buffer reference alone would still let completion append new records after the final truncate-log flush. Split stopping and draining recovery from freeing its state. Stop all recovery producers and drain completion work before shutting down either local allocator. Keep recovery-state release at its existing later point, so its lifetime relative to other teardown users stays unchanged. The second stop at recovery_exit() is harmless once recovery is disabled. KASAN report as below: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881093711e8 by task kworker/u16:3/53 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/u16:3 Not tainted 7.3.0-rc4-next-20260921-pmb-ocfs2-functional-v1+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ocfs2_wq ocfs2_complete_recovery Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x93/0xd0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x20e/0x420 ? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360 ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x23d/0x360 ? __pfx_ocfs2_truncate_log_needs_flush+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_down_write+0x10/0x10 ocfs2_complete_truncate_log_recovery+0x315/0x780 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x160 ? __pfx_ocfs2_complete_truncate_log_recovery+0x10/0x10 ? ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x666/0x11b0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? kfree+0x308/0x580 ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x676/0x11b0 ? __pfx_ocfs2_complete_recovery+0x10/0x10 ? reacquire_held_locks+0xdd/0x200 ? process_one_work+0x7c8/0x1b40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? __pfx_autoremove_wake_function+0x10/0x10 ? process_one_work+0x834/0x1b40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 process_one_work+0x9a8/0x1b40 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? lock_acquire+0x190/0x300 ? lock_is_held_type+0x8f/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x65c/0xe40 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __kthread_parkme+0x177/0x220 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x351/0x460 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x659/0x940 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x74f/0xf70 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Allocated by task 538: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan ---truncated---
CVE-2026-99693 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.1 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2/dlm: serialize migration MLE cleanup on failure A migration MLE has a base reference for the mastering answer and an in-use reference held by dlm_migrate_lockres(). The finishing assertion consumes the base reference, but migration failure drops it again without checking whether the assertion already consumed it. The target queues its migration worker before it acknowledges the ALL_DONE packet, so its finishing assertion can be handled while the sender still waits for the status. If the connection fails before the status arrives, dlm_send_one_lockres() returns an error for a migration that the target has already completed: Old-master sender Finishing assertion ----------------- ------------------- publish MLE; take in-use reference send ALL_DONE; wait for status take lookup reference unlink MLE put lookup and base references send returns a connection error put base reference again; free MLE put in-use reference; access freed MLE dlm_assert_master_handler() holds dlm->spinlock from the MLE lookup to the final puts, and it takes dlm->master_lock around the unlink and the puts. Decide under the same locks: if the MLE is already unhashed, the assertion consumed the base reference, so drop only the sender's in-use reference. Otherwise unlink it before consuming the base reference so a later assertion no longer finds it. An assertion that got there first has also made the target the owner and cleared DLM_LOCK_RES_MIGRATING. Treating the attempt as failed at that point would leave the lockres owned by the target while this node still holds the other nodes' locks and refmap bits, so it could neither be purged nor migrated again. Finish our side as a completed migration does instead: drop those locks under res->spinlock if the target still owns the lockres, and recalculate its usage. Use the same cleanup for the pre-send failure, the send failure and the target-death failure paths. The sender's in-use reference keeps the MLE alive until its final put outside the nested locks. Successful migration retains its existing in-use-only put. A target that has died cannot assert after the sender has seen its death. The o2net node-down callback runs before the DLM one; it disconnects the node and flushes the workqueue that runs the message handlers, so an assertion already received has been handled by the time the DLM removes the node from the domain map. A node that leaves the domain cleanly sends its exit message only after its assertions have been answered. Two windows of the hand-over itself are left as they are: the handler switches the owner and the sender drops the other nodes' locks moments later, and an assertion from a live target that arrives after the sender has given up still meets the owner check in the handler. Waiting for the target before giving up would only stretch the first window into the time in which recovery of the target can observe it. KASAN report, only the relevant frames are kept: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8881190e3c20 by task umount/593 Call Trace: <TASK> dlm_put_mle_inuse+0xce/0xe0 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x16af/0x20d0 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/0x110 ocfs2_cluster_disconnect+0x73/0xc0 ocfs2_dlm_shutdown+0x311/0x440 ocfs2_dismount_volume+0x696/0x940 generic_shutdown_super+0x15f/0x490 kill_block_super+0x40/0xa0 deactivate_locked_super+0xae/0x120 deactivate_super+0xa2/0xc0 cleanup_mnt+0x217/0x450 task_work_run+0x144/0x230 </TASK> Allocated by task 593: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x20b/0x5c0 dlm_migrate_lockres+0x20e/0x20d0 dlm_empty_lockres+0x60a/0xbd0 dlm_unregister_domain+0x53b/0x11d0 o2cb_cluster_disconnect+0xa5/ ---truncated---
CVE-2026-99696 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 6.1 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: find the xattr entry again after defragmenting a bucket ocfs2_xattr_set_entry_bucket() hands loc.xl_entry to ocfs2_xa_set() twice: once for the bucket as it stands, and, if that reports -ENOSPC, once more after ocfs2_defrag_xattr_bucket() has packed the name/value pairs down. Defragmenting ends by sorting the entry array on xe_name_hash. Buckets are kept sorted, so the sort only permutes entries that share a hash, but lib/sort.c is an unstable heapsort and it does permute them. loc.xl_entry is an address inside xh_entries[], so afterwards it denotes whichever entry landed in that slot rather than the one the search found. The second ocfs2_xa_set() then works on the wrong entry. Nothing on that path compares the entry's name with xi->xi_name, so what happens depends on how the two entries compare in size: ocfs2_xa_reuse_entry() trips its BUG_ON() when the padded name sizes differ, and otherwise the new value is written into the neighbouring attribute's value slot while the attribute being set is left untouched. setxattr() reports success either way. Remember the entry's hash before defragmenting and look the entry up again afterwards, the way ocfs2_xattr_bucket_find() does. An entry that cannot be found again means the bucket no longer holds what the search found, so fail with -EFSCORRUPTED rather than writing through the stale pointer.
CVE-2026-99698 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.1 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/cma: accept memory of CMA areas reserved at a fixed address CMA areas allocated from memblock have their memory accepted by memblock_alloc_range_nid(), but areas reserved at a fixed address with memblock_reserve() are not. If a fixed CMA area is requested by the cma=<size>@<base> command line parameter, it may be in regular RAM and on TDX and SEV-SNP guests it must be accepted. Accept the memory of fixed CMA areas as well, so that all CMA areas are accepted regardless of how they were reserved.
CVE-2026-99699 1 Linux 2 Linux, Linux Kernel 2026-11-20 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/cma: accept memory of multi-range CMA areas Patch series "mm/cma: accept memory of CMA areas reserved with memblock_reserve()", v1. Pages of allocated CMA areas are released to the buddy allocator with __free_pages(), which does not check for unaccepted memory. This usually works because memblock accepts the memory it allocates. However, multi-range CMA areas, used by hugetlb_cma, and fixed CMA areas requested with cma=<size>@<base> are reserved with memblock_reserve() and their memory is never accepted. On TDX and SEV-SNP guests the first access to such a page is fatal. To ease the backporting, each case is addressed by a separate patch: - patch 1 accepts the memory of multi-range CMA areas - patch 2 does the same for the fixed CMA areas The second patch won't apply cleanly to 6.6 and 6.12, but I believe the stable team LLMs will take care of that :) This patch (of 2): On systems with unaccepted memory, memblock allocations accept the allocated range, but when cma_declare_contiguous_multi() uses open coded allocation of multiple ranges, it reserves them with memblock_reserve() and they are never accepted. These pages are released to the buddy allocator by cma_activate_area() with __free_pages() that does not check for unaccepted memory, so the first access to such a page in a TDX or SEV-SNP guest is fatal. Accept the memory of each range when it is reserved.
CVE-2026-129082 2026-11-20 4.3 Medium
Missing Authorization vulnerability in Omnisend Newsletters, Email Marketing, SMS and Popups by Omnisend omnisend allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Newsletters, Email Marketing, SMS and Popups by Omnisend: from n/a through 1.9.1.
CVE-2026-127201 2026-11-20 4.3 Medium
The Simple Membership WP user Import plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 1.9.2 This is due to missing or incorrect nonce validation on the add function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to import arbitrary WordPress users into Simple Membership and modify their WordPress role via the plugin's membership-level-to-role mapping via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link. Successful exploitation additionally requires an action by an administrator — the attacker cannot trigger the vulnerability on their own.
CVE-2026-131804 2026-11-20 7.2 High
The Seraphinite Accelerator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'HTTP_USER_AGENT' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 2.31 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. Exploitation requires that an administrator has previously enabled the 'Enable logging' and 'HTTP trace' diagnostic options in the plugin's Advanced → Debug settings, both of which are disabled by default.
CVE-2026-131244 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 4.3 Medium
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user with permission to edit and run playbooks could modify a child playbook callback handle associated with another playbook run, which could alter the callback behavior of that run. The vulnerability exists because the Playbook API does not verify that callback-handle updates belong to the related parent and child playbook runs.
CVE-2026-131249 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 4.3 Medium
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user with permission to view, edit, and run playbooks and access to at least one container label could retrieve a callback handle from a playbook run outside the container-label scope granted to that account. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not verify that the requested callback handle belongs to the parent playbook run that launched the child playbook. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Data access automation API (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/python-playbook-api-reference/8.8.0/automation-api/data-access-automation-api) in the Splunk documentation.
CVE-2026-131254 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 5.4 Medium
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user with permission to create containers on one label could use the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to create a container with a parent relationship to a container that the user cannot access. This could let the user alter incident lineage across authorization boundaries and identify existing restricted containers. The vulnerability is possible because the REST API accepts a customer-supplied parent relationship when creating a container without authorizing access to the referenced container. For more information see REST Containers (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/rest-api-reference/8.6.0/container-endpoints/rest-containers) and Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation.
CVE-2026-131255 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 7.5 High
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an unauthenticated user could gain administrator privileges through a user account that receives an unintended role. A user that holds a role with permission to create or modify users and assign roles must assign the target account a role with a numeric name through the user-management Representational State Transfer (REST) API. The vulnerability is possible because the API resolves a numeric role name as a role identifier instead of preserving the requested role name.
CVE-2026-131256 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 7.2 High
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, an authenticated user that holds a role with the System Settings edit permission could execute arbitrary code on the host that runs Splunk SOAR. The vulnerability is possible because the Representational State Transfer (REST) API accepts package references from untrusted sources and passes them to the dependency installer.
CVE-2026-131259 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 5.4 Medium
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user with permission to create and view containers for a label could use the Representational State Transfer (REST) API to create a container that references a workbook phase in a case the user cannot view, disclosing the phase name and creating an inconsistent phase association. The vulnerability exists because the Container REST API does not enforce the same case-scoped authorization when it accepts a workbook-phase reference during container creation.
CVE-2026-131261 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 8.8 High
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with the Apps edit permission could execute arbitrary code as the user account that runs Splunk SOAR by installing a malicious app. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not restrict app dependencies to validated binary packages before installing them.
CVE-2026-131263 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 8.8 High
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with only the apps:edit permission could install a connector app that causes Splunk SOAR to write attacker-controlled files outside the app directory. This could let the user modify files used by Splunk SOAR and execute arbitrary code as the user account that runs Splunk SOAR. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR constructs the dependency installation command from app-supplied metadata without preventing that metadata from changing its arguments. For more information see Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.8.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) and Add and configure apps and assets to provide actions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.6.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-apps-and-assets/add-and-configure-apps-and-assets-to-provide-actions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation.
CVE-2026-131264 1 Splunk 1 Splunk 2026-11-20 6.3 Medium
In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.8.0, a user that holds a role with the System Settings edit permission could cause Splunk SOAR to send the stored root credential for an external credential store to a host that the user controls. Depending on the configuration, the exposed credential could include an access token, application secret, account password, or client certificate. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR reuses the stored credential when the user changes the external credential store endpoint without supplying replacement credentials.
CVE-2026-131178 1 Splunk 1 Splunk Enterprise 2026-11-20 7.6 High
In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could craft a shared Classic Dashboard that runs arbitrary Search Processing Language (SPL) commands for another authenticated user. Exploitation requires the dashboard viewer to open the shared dashboard. The injected commands could access data available to the dashboard viewer, modify data available to the dashboard viewer, and partially disrupt Splunk Enterprise. For more information see Add sparklines to search results (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/search/search-manual/10.6/calculate-statistics/add-sparklines-to-search-results), Configure dashboard permissions (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/create-dashboards-and-reports/simple-xml-dashboards/10.6/manage-and-share-dashboards/configure-dashboard-permissions), and SPL safeguards for risky commands (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.6/best-practices-for-splunk-platform-security/spl-safeguards-for-risky-commands) in the Splunk documentation.
CVE-2026-131180 1 Splunk 1 Splunk Enterprise 2026-11-20 6.3 Medium
In Splunk Enterprise versions below 10.4.5, 10.2.9, 10.0.12, and 9.4.17, a user who holds the "power" Splunk role could create and share a dashboard that contains attacker-controlled Search Processing Language (SPL). The SPL could run using the permissions of the user who opens the dashboard. With this access, the user who created the dashboard could expose stored credentials and write data to an index. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk Enterprise does not correctly escape field names in searches that use the rename command. For more information see rename (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/spl-search-reference/10.4/search-commands/rename) and SPL safeguards for risky commands (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-enterprise/administer/manage-users-and-security/10.4/best-practices-for-splunk-platform-security/spl-safeguards-for-risky-commands) in the Splunk documentation.