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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-90081 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: use wq_has_sleeper() in rds_cong_map_updated() rds_cong_map_updated() runs after a peer's congestion map has been rewritten (by rds_tcp_cong_recv() and rds_ib_cong_recv(), or the clear-all in the loopback and IB send-completion paths). It bumps rds_cong_generation and then checks waitqueue_active() on map->m_waitq and on rds_poll_waitq to decide whether anyone needs waking. atomic_inc() carries no ordering and waitqueue_active() is a plain load, so nothing orders the map and generation stores before the wait queue reads. The waiters do the mirror image: rds_cong_wait() adds itself to m_waitq and then tests the port bit, and rds_poll() registers on rds_poll_waitq and then reads the generation. That is the store-buffering pattern described above waitqueue_active() in include/linux/wait.h - the updater can observe an empty wait queue while the waiter still observes the port as congested, and no wake-up is issued. rds_cong_wait() is an interruptible sleep with no timeout, so a sender blocked on a congested port stays blocked until the next congestion update from that peer arrives or a signal is delivered. A poll() waiter misses the map-updated notification the same way. Use wq_has_sleeper(), which is waitqueue_active() preceded by the required full barrier, as rds_tcp_state_change() already does for the same pattern. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90080 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-pf: fix NULL deref of af_xdp_zc_qidx on rep setup af_xdp_zc_qidx tracks receive queues using AF_XDP zero-copy and is allocated during PF/VF probe. Representors and other non-AF_XDP paths leave the pointer NULL, but several call sites used test_bit() on it unconditionally. Switching to devlink eswitch mode creates representors and runs otx2_init_hw_resources(), which reaches otx2_pool_aq_init() and oopses when dereferencing the NULL bitmap. Add NULL checks before every af_xdp_zc_qidx test_bit() use in the RSS, ethtool, XSK, and pool init paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90079 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: fix cn20k mailbox lifetime on repeated rvu_mbox_init() rvu_mbox_init() is called separately for AF-PF mailboxes during probe and for AF-VF mailboxes when SR-IOV is enabled. Each call used to allocate a new ng_rvu object, leaking the first allocation when the pointer was overwritten on the second call. Sharing one ng_rvu across both paths exposed several teardown bugs: the error path freed all cn20k mailbox DMA and kfree()d ng_rvu even when only the failing init type should be unwound, leaving live AF-PF mailbox memory in use after an AF-VF init failure. mutex_init() was also re-run on the AF-VF path while AF-PF mailbox handlers could still hold rvu->mbox_lock. Probe and SR-IOV failure paths did not release cn20k mailbox DMA either, since cleanup only happened in rvu_remove(). Allocate ng_rvu once with devm_kzalloc(), initialize mbox_lock in the same block, unwind only the mailbox memory for the failing init type, and free cn20k mailbox DMA from the probe and pci_enable_sriov() error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90078 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_skbmod: fix length calculations and avoid invalid header warnings syzbot reported a warning in skb_network_header_len() triggered by tcf_skbmod_act(): !skb_transport_header_was_set(skb) WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 skb_network_header_len include/linux/skbuff.h:3243 [inline] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 14949 at net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 tcf_skbmod_act+0xfe8/0x1810 net/sched/act_skbmod.c:55 There are a few issues in tcf_skbmod_act(): 1. Calling skb_network_header_len() assumes skb->transport_header is set, which is not guaranteed when tcf_skbmod_act() runs at TC ingress. 2. Unconditionally calling skb_mac_header_len() at the beginning of tcf_skbmod_act() triggers a warning on L3 devices (e.g. TUN) where the MAC header is unset, evaluating to an underflowed garbage length. 3. On TC ingress, skb->data points to the network header. Adding the MAC header length to the IP header length causes skb_ensure_writable() to request more bytes than the actual IP packet length, dropping valid short packets (e.g. 28-byte UDP/IPv4 packets). Fix these by: - Using skb_network_offset(skb) + sizeof(struct iphdr/ipv6hdr) for SKBMOD_F_ECN so that the required length is correctly calculated on both ingress (offset == 0) and egress (offset == mac_len). - Setting max_edit_len to ETH_HLEN for Ethernet header modifications after validating ARPHRD_ETHER. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90077 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fix a resource leak in copy_net_ns() error handling path Currently, preinit_net() does two things: (1) call ns_common_init() which might fail (2) initialize resources which does not fail However, preinit_net() is returning early when (1) fails, and copy_net_ns() is jumping to the dec_ucounts: label. As a result, resources allocated by net_alloc() are leaking. We need to call key_remove_domain() and net_passive_dec() in order to release resources allocated by net_alloc(). We cannot simply jump to the put_userns: label when preinit_net() failed, for (2) is not yet done. But we can reorder (1) and (2), for there is no dependency between (1) and (2). Therefore, this patch decouples (1) from preinit_net() and changes preinit_net() back to a void function, and calls ns_common_init() after preinit_net() succeeded. Then, we can jump to immediately after ns_common_free() of the put_userns: label. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90076 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq: add overflow bounds to quantum and initial quantum fq_init() computes quantum = 2 * psched_mtu() and initial_quantum = 10 * psched_mtu() with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000; the 2 * and 10 * multiplications wrap to 0 in 32-bit arithmetic, so q->quantum == 0. Then in fq_dequeue() the credit-refill loop adds 0 to f->credit (which stays <= 0) and goto begin loops forever under the qdisc lock, creating a soft lockup. Clamp psched_mtu() to [1, 1 << 20] before multiplying so the product cannot wrap, then cap the result at 1 << 20, matching the bound already enforced on TCA_FQ_QUANTUM in fq_change(). Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) is large enough that 2 * psched_mtu() wraps (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90075 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_codel: clamp default quantum and mtu fq_codel_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_codel_dequeue(), causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_codel_change() and constrain to [256, FQ_CODEL_QUANTUM_MAX]. The same unclamped psched_mtu() is assigned to q->cparams.mtu a bit below, and fq_codel_change() never updates it. codel_should_drop() tests "*backlog <= params->mtu"; with mtu == 0x80000000 (~2 GiB) and the default 32 MiB memory_limit, the test is always true, so CoDel is silently and completely disabled (no drops, no ECN). Declare a single clamped mtu and assign both q->quantum and q->cparams.mtu from it, which also removes the double psched_mtu() call. Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90074 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: fq_pie: clamp default quantum to avoid signed overflow fq_pie_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) without clamping. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, which overflows the signed flow->deficit to INT_MIN in fq_pie_qdisc_dequeue(), causing an infinite loop and soft lockup. Emulate fq_pie_policy which is already bounded to [1, 1 << 20]; clamp the default to [256, 1 << 20]. 256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum. Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90073 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum before hhf_change() to avoid overflow hhf_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) with no overflow check. A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes weight * quantum overflow the signed deficit in hhf_dequeue(), spinning forever. Clamp q->quantum before hhf_change() so both the opt and !opt paths see a sane quantum. Without this, bare "tc qdisc add ... hhf" succeeds with a clamped quantum but "tc qdisc add ... hhf limit 1000" (any option present) fails with -EINVAL because hhf_change() re-validates the unclamped default (sch_hhf.c:559). 256 matches fq_codel's floor and is a sane minimum for a DRR quantum. Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90072 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: sfq: clamp quantum to avoid signed overflow soft lockup sfq_init() sets q->quantum = psched_mtu(qdisc_dev(sch)) (unsigned). A device with a huge MTU (e.g. dummy with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634) makes psched_mtu() return 0x80000000, so slot->allot = INT_MIN and INT_MIN + INT_MIN toggles between INT_MIN and 0 forever, spinning sfq_dequeue() under the qdisc lock. Clamp the quantum to [256, 1 << 20] so the refill loop terminates. The lower bound also covers q->quantum == 0 (psched_mtu() returning 0), which spins sfq_dequeue() identically. sfq_change() already rejects a negative quantum, so only the init path was exposed. Conditions to recreate the bug: a device whose MTU (plus hard_header_len) wraps psched_mtu() into the sign bit (e.g. a dummy device with max_mtu == 0 accepting MTU 2147483634). Requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90070 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure st33zp24_status() ignores the result of the transport read and returns data even when no byte was received. The I2C transport, for example, skips i2c_master_recv() when the register-select write is short or fails, leaving data uninitialized. The resulting stack value can be interpreted as TPM_STS flags and let status checks complete spuriously. The status callback cannot propagate a transport error. Return zero unless recv() reports exactly one byte. With no status bits set, callers retry or take their existing timeout or error path instead of acting on an invalid status value. This issue was found by a static analysis checker and confirmed by manual source review. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90068 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: dapm: Fix off-by-one check on the second enum channel The snd_soc_dapm_put_enum_double() rejects item[0] once it reaches e->items, but it lets item[1] be equal to it. Both go on to snd_soc_enum_item_to_val(), which indexes e->values with no bound of its own, so an enum with a value table reads one element past the end. The indexing arrived with the MUX consolidation, which relaxed the item[1] check in the same hunk. The value MUX handler it deleted used >= there, and the snd_soc_put_enum_double() in soc-ops.c still does. Only adav80x pairs a value table with two shifts, and its second channel looks accidental, but the control does report two values. Writing three into it reads off the end of adav80x_mux_values. The core catches that only under CONFIG_SND_CTL_INPUT_VALIDATION, which defaults off. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90066 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: samples/ftrace: Fix kthread_stop() on ERR_PTR in ftrace-direct-multi-modify ftrace_direct_multi_init() assigns kthread_run()'s return value to simple_tsk without an IS_ERR() check. When kthread_run() fails it returns ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM), but init still returns 0, so the module loads with simple_tsk holding an error pointer. On unload, ftrace_direct_multi_exit() then passes that ERR_PTR to kthread_stop(), leading to a null-pointer-dereference. Check the return value of kthread_run() with IS_ERR(); on failure, unregister the ftrace direct call and propagate the error code. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90065 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/smc: release the internal TCP sock on IPPROTO_SMC socket creation failure IPPROTO_SMC sockets create an internal TCP sock ("clcsock") from the proto->init hook. When socket creation fails after proto->init has run - e.g. a cgroup BPF program attached to BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE denies the socket - sk_common_release() only invokes sk_prot->destroy if it is set, but neither smc_inet_prot nor smc_inet6_prot defines it, and smc_destruct() returns early unless sk_state is SMC_CLOSED. As a result, every failing socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_SMC) call leaks one tcp_sock, so an unprivileged task able to attach a deny-all BPF_CGROUP_INET_SOCK_CREATE program to its own cgroup can grow kernel memory unboundedly. Add a .destroy hook to both protos that releases the clcsock via smc_clcsock_release(). smc_sk_init() hashes the sock into the smc hashinfo before the clcsock is created, and smc_diag dumps walk that hash dereferencing smc->clcsock without taking clcsock_release_lock, while sk_common_release() calls .destroy before .unhash. Unhash the sock before releasing the clcsock, as __smc_release() does, so a concurrent dump cannot observe the release; the second unhash in sk_common_release() is a no-op. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90064 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe: Reject page faults from non-fault-mode scratch VMs Having scratch enabled does not make a VM capable of handling recoverable page faults. Allowing scratch VMs through the ASID lookup also admits dma-fence mode VMs. If such a VM faults on an already valid VMA, the handler reports success without fixing the fault, causing the GPU to retry indefinitely. Only allow fault-mode VMs through the ASID lookup. Fault-mode VMs using scratch remain supported, while faults from 3D VMs are rejected. (cherry picked from commit bfb24a06405b652d37831f3fb66b71d33a6605de) | ||||
| CVE-2026-90063 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: virtio-net: Ensure that TCP packets don't overflow gso_segs The user can specify any gso_size in a packet crafted with an AF_PACKET PACKET_VNET_HDR socket, even smaller than TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. At the same time, GSO_MAX_SIZE = 8 * GSO_MAX_SEGS = 8 * 65535. When the user crafts a packet with gso_size < 8, there is a risk for partial GSO to overflow the 16-bit gso_segs field when dividing the SKB length by gso_size. Adjust gso_size of TCP packets to be at least TCP_MIN_GSO_SIZE = 8. Keep gso_size of UDP GSO packets, as gso_size=1 is valid and explicitly tested at tools/testing/selftests/net/tun.c:649. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90061 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_tables: skip double clone set expressions on element insert Both the dynset and newsetelem path clone the existing set expressions when setting set element expressions if no override expressions are provided. This results in a double clone, once to clone the template set expressions then another clone on the new element. Add a flag to annotate if userspace provides a override expression (ie. expression of the same type of the set but different configuration), otherwise borrow the existing expression from the set. Add conditionals to release expression iif they represent an override. Use this new override_exprs flag to dump the dynset expression override to userspace. This simplifies the existing logic and it also fixes a bug with the connlimit expression which results in a module refcount imbalance WARNING splat when resorting on the default set expressions. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90060 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: control: Don't add invalid kcontrols to LED layer The kcontrol LED state layer tries to track the all associated kcontrol elements with naive assumptions that they are readable. But one can create a write-only element that has no get callback (even a user element can do it), and this may lead to a NULL dereference at the call chain of snd_ctl_led_notify(), as found by syzkaller. For avoiding the Oops, add a sanity check of the kcontrol's info and get callbacks, and just skip the invalid kcontrols before assigning the kctl to the LED layer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90058 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: bound qdisc_pkt_len to prevent qdisc soft lockup qdisc_get_stab() accepts a user-supplied size table, and __qdisc_calculate_pkt_len() amplifies qdisc_pkt_len() through the overhead, the size-table data (u16), and size_log (up to STAB_SIZE_LOG_MAX). A crafted stab can therefore set qdisc_pkt_len() to ~1 GiB for an ordinary skb. Per-flow deficit schedulers such as DRR and ETS replenish one quantum per loop iteration; with a tiny quantum (1) they spin billions of times under the qdisc lock, producing a soft lockup / RCU stall as illustrated by vega@nebusec.ai. Cap the final qdisc_pkt_len() to QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX so the size-table amplification cannot drive deficit schedulers into an unbounded loop. A legitimate size table (e.g. qfq's overhead 999999999, which is handled by dropping) is still accepted. Introduce cap QDISC_PKT_LEN_MAX (1 << 20) = 1 MiB which is well above any legitimate single-skb wire length: the largest current skb->len is GSO_MAX_SIZE (524280), and an ATM-style size table (53/48 cell tax) amplifies that to ~578 KB, both comfortably below 1 MiB. At the same time, 1 MiB bounds the deficit refill loop to ~1M iterations per packet with quantum=1, which completes in a few milliseconds well under the demonstrated softlockup threshold (~10^9 iterations). Conditions to recreate the bug: - CONFIG_NET_SCHED=y, CONFIG_NET_SCH_DRR=y (or CONFIG_NET_SCH_ETS=y). - Attach a DRR (or ETS) root qdisc with a crafted TCA_STAB that amplifies qdisc_pkt_len to ~1 GiB (e.g. size_log=15, data=[32768]). - Add a class with a tiny quantum of 1 and send one small packet; the deficit loop spins billions of times under the qdisc lock and trips the softlockup detector (panic with kernel.softlockup_panic=1). - Reachable as root or from an unprivileged user in a fresh user+net namespace (unshare -Urn) with namespace-local CAP_NET_ADMIN. | ||||
| CVE-2026-90056 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-17 | N/A |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fec: only stop PTP if it was initialized fec_ptp_init() is only called when fep->bufdesc_ex is available. However, fec_probe() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() on the failed_init path, and fec_drv_remove() unconditionally calls fec_ptp_stop() during device removal. Check fep->bufdesc_ex before calling fec_ptp_stop() in both paths to avoid stopping PTP when it was not initialized. | ||||