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| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-64437 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too: SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock() worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock pointing at the freed file_lock. A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block __locks_delete_block locks_delete_block ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock smb2_remove_blocked_lock smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn handle_ksmbd_work Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit) ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192 Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger. Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE so any non-active work is skipped. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64439 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL completion callback and treat any negative return from crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the worker dereferences the freed slab on completion. KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend bound to krb5->encrypt_name: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7 The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing crypto_wait_req() through every call site. Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to the krb5 enctype name. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65083 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Openshell | 2026-09-03 | 9.9 Critical |
| NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its sandbox provisioning API, where an attacker could cause an incomplete list of disallowed inputs. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, information disclosure, data tampering, and denial of service. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65085 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Openshell | 2026-09-03 | 5.2 Medium |
| NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its inference proxy, where an attacker could cause an improper encoding or escaping of output. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to information disclosure and data tampering. | ||||
| CVE-2026-65086 | 2 Linux, Nvidia | 2 Linux Kernel, Openshell | 2026-09-03 | 6.8 Medium |
| NVIDIA OpenShell for Linux contains a vulnerability in its sandbox exec handler, where an attacker could cause an OS command injection. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, information disclosure, and data tampering. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64086 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) include PEC byte in pmbus_block_xfer read buffer adm1266_pmbus_block_xfer() sets up the read transaction with .buf = data->read_buf, .len = ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2, but read_buf in struct adm1266_data is declared as u8 read_buf[ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 1]; For a max-length block response (length byte = 255 + up to 1 PEC byte), the i2c controller is told to write 257 bytes into a 256-byte buffer, putting one byte past the end of read_buf. The same response also makes the subsequent PEC compare if (crc != msgs[1].buf[msgs[1].buf[0] + 1]) read a byte beyond the array. Bump the read_buf declaration to ADM1266_PMBUS_BLOCK_MAX + 2 so the buffer can hold the length byte, up to 255 payload bytes, and the PEC byte the i2c_msg length already accounts for. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64087 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/adm1266) reject implausible blackbox record_count adm1266_nvmem_read_blackbox() loops over a record_count that comes straight from byte 3 of the BLACKBOX_INFO response. The destination buffer is data->dev_mem, sized for the nvmem cell's declared 2048 bytes (ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS * ADM1266_BLACKBOX_SIZE = 32 * 64). A device that reports a record_count greater than 32 -- whether due to firmware bugs, bus corruption, or a non-responsive slave returning 0xff -- would walk read_buff past the end of the dev_mem allocation on the trailing iterations. Cap record_count at ADM1266_BLACKBOX_MAX_RECORDS (introduced here) before entering the loop and return -EIO on any larger value, so a malformed BLACKBOX_INFO response cannot drive the loop out of bounds. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64300 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/aux: Fix page UAF in map_range() map_range() reads rb->aux_pages[], rb->aux_nr_pages and rb->aux_pgoff via perf_mmap_to_page() while holding only event->mmap_mutex. Those fields are serialized by rb->aux_mutex, and mmap_mutex is per event. Thus, two events sharing one rb via PERF_EVENT_IOC_SET_OUTPUT can race rb_alloc_aux() with map_range(), leading to a page-UAF scenario as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 ===== ===== rb_alloc_aux() map_range() [1]: allocate rb->aux_pages[0] [2]: rb->aux_nr_pages++ [3]: perf_mmap_to_page() returns rb->aux_pages[0] [4]: map it as VM_PFNMAP [5]: rb->aux_pgoff = 1 munmap the page [6]: free rb->aux_pages[0] Pages mapped as VM_PFNMAP have no refcount protection, so CPU 1 holds a mapping to a freed physical frame. Fix this by taking rb->aux_mutex across the page walk in map_range(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-64302 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/mm: Fix freeing of PMD-sized vmemmap pages Commit bf9e4e30f353 ("x86/mm: use pagetable_free()"), switched from freeing non-boot page tables through __free_pages() to pagetable_free(). However, the function is also called to free vmemmap pages. Given that vmemmap pages are not page tables, already the page_ptdesc(page) is wrong. But worse, pagetable_free() calls: __free_pages(page, compound_order(page)); Since vmemmap pages are not compound pages (see vmemmap_alloc_block()) -- except for HVO, which doesn't apply here -- only first page of a PMD-sized vmemmap page is freed, leaking the other ones. Fix it by properly decoupling pagetable and vmemmap freeing. free_pagetable() no longer has to mess with SECTION_INFO, as only the vmemmap is marked like that in register_page_bootmem_memmap(). The indentation in remove_pmd_table() is messed up. Fix that while touching it. Bootmem info handling will soon be fixed up. For now, handle it similar to free_pagetable(), just avoiding the ifdef. [ dhansen: changelog munging. More imperative voice ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-64349 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: dwc3: fix dwc3_readl() and dwc3_writel() calls in dwc3_ulpi_setup() The dwc3_ulpi_setup() calls the register read and write calls with dwc3->regs when both these calls take the dwc3 structure directly. Chnage these two calls to fix the following sparse warning, and possibly a nasty bug in the dwc3_ulpi_setup() code: drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:796:45: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:796:45: expected struct dwc3 *dwc drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:796:45: got void [noderef] __iomem *regs drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:798:40: warning: incorrect type in argument 1 (different address spaces) drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:798:40: expected struct dwc3 *dwc drivers/usb/dwc3/core.c:798:40: got void [noderef] __iomem *regs | ||||
| CVE-2026-64350 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: cdnsp: fix stream context array leak in cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() cdnsp_alloc_stream_info() allocates stream_info->stream_ctx_array with cdnsp_alloc_stream_ctx(). If a later stream ring allocation or stream mapping update fails, the error path frees the allocated stream rings and stream_rings array, but leaves stream_ctx_array allocated. Free the stream context array before falling through to the stream_rings cleanup path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64337 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: mtu3: unmap request DMA on queue failure mtu3_gadget_queue() maps the request before checking whether the QMU GPD ring can accept another transfer. the request is returned with -EAGAIN before it is linked on the endpoint request list if mtu3_prepare_transfer() fails. Normal completion and dequeue paths unmap requests from mtu3_req_complete(), but this error path never reaches that helper, so the DMA mapping is left active. Unmap the request before returning from the failed queue path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64339 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: bound bulk IN response length to the received transfer usbio_bulk_msg() copies bpkt_len = le16_to_cpu(bpkt->len) bytes out of the bulk IN buffer (usbio->rxbuf, allocated with size usbio->rxbuf_len) into the caller's buffer. bpkt_len is fully controlled by the device and is only checked against ibuf_len; ibuf_len in turn is checked against usbio->txbuf_len, not against rxbuf_len: if ((obuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt))) || (ibuf_len > (usbio->txbuf_len - sizeof(*bpkt)))) return -EMSGSIZE; txbuf_len and rxbuf_len are taken independently from the bulk OUT and bulk IN endpoint wMaxPacketSize in usbio_probe(). A malicious or malfunctioning device that advertises a large bulk OUT endpoint and a small bulk IN endpoint (e.g. by claiming one of the quirk-free IDs such as the Lattice NX33U, 0x2ac1:0x20cb) therefore makes ibuf_len, and hence the device-supplied bpkt_len, exceed rxbuf_len. memcpy() then reads up to txbuf_len - rxbuf_len bytes past the end of the rxbuf slab object. The over-read bytes are handed back to the i2c layer and on to user space through i2c-dev, disclosing adjacent slab memory; with KASAN this is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read. The number of bytes actually received is already known: act equals the URB actual_length and is bounded by rxbuf_len. Reject any response that claims more payload than was received, mirroring the existing "act < sizeof(*bpkt)" check just above. The control path (usbio_ctrl_msg()) is not affected: it uses a single buffer (ctrlbuf) for both directions, so its analogous copy can never leave the allocation. Found by code review. The out-of-bounds read was confirmed under AddressSanitizer with a faithful userspace model of usbio_bulk_msg()'s receive path (an rxbuf_len-sized buffer, the same act/ibuf_len/bpkt_len checks and the memcpy). A USB raw-gadget + dummy_hcd reproducer is also available. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64311 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: loongson - Remove broken and unused loongson-rng The loongson-rng rng_alg has several vulnerabilities, including not providing forward security, and a use-after-free bug due to the use of wait_for_completion_interruptible(). Meanwhile, the rng_alg framework doesn't really have any purpose in the first place other than to access the software algorithms crypto/drbg.c and crypto/jitterentropy.c. Hardware-specific rng_algs have no in-kernel user, and unlike hwrng there's no feed into the actual Linux RNG. As such, there's really no point to this code. There are of course other rng_alg drivers that are similarly unused, but they're similarly in the process of being phased out, e.g. https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529193648.18172-1-ebiggers@kernel.org and https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529220430.34135-1-ebiggers@kernel.org Given that, there's no point in fixing forward these vulnerabilities, and it makes much more sense to simply roll back the addition of this driver. If this platform provides TRNG (not PRNG) functionality, it could make sense to add a hwrng driver, but it would be quite different. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64314 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate poly1305 template argument chachapoly_create() still accepts the compatibility poly1305 parameter in the template name, but it assumes the second template argument is always present and immediately passes it to strcmp(). When the argument is missing, crypto_attr_alg_name() returns an error pointer. Check for that before comparing the name so malformed template instantiations fail with an error instead of dereferencing the error pointer in strcmp(). This matches the surrounding Crypto API template pattern where crypto_attr_alg_name() results are validated before string-specific use. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64315 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in *_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG is enabled. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64318 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array: int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count); ... for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) { struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i; ... lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix); pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016 drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds). The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via msdos_partition() -> aix_partition(). Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64447 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the device's reference count drops to zero. Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown has already freed it: 1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free. 2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit() internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free. Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed manually. Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(), causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead. Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in the return values of the two affected error paths. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64064 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: Fix netfs_invalidate_folio() to clear dirty bit if all changes gone If a streaming write is made, this will leave the relevant modified folio in a not-uptodate, but dirty state with a netfs_folio struct hung off of folio->private indicating the dirty range. Subsequently truncating the file such that the dirty data in the folio is removed, but the first part of the folio theoretically remains will cause the netfs_folio struct to be discarded... but will leave the dirty flag set. If the folio is then read via mmap(), netfs_read_folio() will see that the page is dirty and jump to netfs_read_gaps() to fill in the missing bits. netfs_read_gaps(), however, expects there to be a netfs_folio struct present and can oops because truncate removed it. Fix this by calling folio_cancel_dirty() in netfs_invalidate_folio() in the event that all the dirty data in the folio is erased (as nfs does). Also add some tracepoints to log modifications to a dirty page. This can be reproduced with something like: dd if=/dev/zero of=/xfstest.test/foo bs=1M count=1 umount /xfstest.test mount /xfstest.test xfs_io -c "w 0xbbbf 0xf96c" \ -c "truncate 0xbbbf" \ -c "mmap -r 0xb000 0x11000" \ -c "mr 0xb000 0x11000" \ /xfstest.test/foo with fscaching disabled (otherwise streaming writes are suppressed) and a change to netfs_perform_write() to disallow streaming writes if the fd is open O_RDWR: if (//(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ) || <--- comment this out netfs_is_cache_enabled(ctx)) { It should be reproducible even without this change, but if prevents the above trivial xfs_io command from reproducing it. Note that the initial dd is important: the file must start out sufficiently large that the zero-point logic doesn't just clear the gaps because it knows there's nothing in the file to read yet. Unmounting and mounting is needed to clear the pagecache (there are other ways to do that that may also work). This was initially reproduced with the generic/522 xfstest on some patches that remove the FMODE_READ restriction. | ||||
| CVE-2026-64065 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-09-03 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfs: fix VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO() issue in netfs_write_begin() call The multiple runs of generic/013 test-case is capable to reproduce a kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1504 with probability of 30%. while true; do sudo ./check generic/013 done [ 9849.452376] page: refcount:3 mapcount:0 mapping:00000000e58ff252 index:0x10781 pfn:0x1c322 [ 9849.452412] memcg:ffff8881a1915800 [ 9849.452417] aops:ceph_aops ino:1000058db9e dentry name(?):"f9XXXXXX" [ 9849.452432] flags: 0x17ffffc0000000(node=0|zone=2|lastcpupid=0x1fffff) [ 9849.452441] raw: 0017ffffc0000000 0000000000000000 dead000000000122 ffff88816110d248 [ 9849.452445] raw: 0000000000010781 0000000000000000 00000003ffffffff ffff8881a1915800 [ 9849.452447] page dumped because: VM_BUG_ON_FOLIO(!folio_test_locked(folio)) [ 9849.452474] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 9849.452476] kernel BUG at mm/filemap.c:1504! [ 9849.478635] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI [ 9849.481772] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 84223 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 7.0.0-rc1+ #18 PREEMPT(full) [ 9849.482881] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-9.fc43 06/1 0/2025 [ 9849.484539] RIP: 0010:folio_unlock+0x85/0xa0 [ 9849.485076] Code: 89 df 31 f6 e8 1c f3 ff ff 48 8b 5d f8 c9 31 c0 31 d2 31 f6 31 ff c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c6 80 6c d9 a7 48 89 df e8 4b b3 10 00 <0f> 0b 48 89 df e8 21 e6 2c 00 eb 9d 0f 1f 40 00 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 [ 9849.493818] RSP: 0018:ffff8881bb8076b0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 9849.495740] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffea00070c8980 RCX: 0000000000000000 [ 9849.498678] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000 [ 9849.500559] RBP: ffff8881bb8076b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 [ 9849.501097] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000010782000 [ 9849.502108] R13: ffff8881935de738 R14: ffff88816110d010 R15: 0000000000001000 [ 9849.502516] FS: 00007e36cbe94740(0000) GS:ffff88824a899000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 9849.502996] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 9849.503810] CR2: 000000c0002b0000 CR3: 000000011bbf6004 CR4: 0000000000772ef0 [ 9849.504459] PKRU: 55555554 [ 9849.504626] Call Trace: [ 9849.505242] <TASK> [ 9849.505379] netfs_write_begin+0x7c8/0x10a0 [ 9849.505877] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ 9849.506384] ? __pfx_netfs_write_begin+0x10/0x10 [ 9849.507178] ceph_write_begin+0x8c/0x1c0 [ 9849.507934] generic_perform_write+0x391/0x8f0 [ 9849.508503] ? __pfx_generic_perform_write+0x10/0x10 [ 9849.509062] ? file_update_time_flags+0x19a/0x4b0 [ 9849.509581] ? ceph_get_caps+0x63/0xf0 [ 9849.510259] ? ceph_get_caps+0x63/0xf0 [ 9849.510530] ceph_write_iter+0xe79/0x1ae0 [ 9849.511282] ? __pfx_ceph_write_iter+0x10/0x10 [ 9849.511839] ? lock_acquire+0x1ad/0x310 [ 9849.512334] ? ksys_write+0xf9/0x230 [ 9849.512582] ? lock_is_held_type+0xaa/0x140 [ 9849.513128] vfs_write+0x512/0x1110 [ 9849.513634] ? __fget_files+0x33/0x350 [ 9849.513893] ? __pfx_vfs_write+0x10/0x10 [ 9849.514143] ? mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x30 [ 9849.514394] ksys_write+0xf9/0x230 [ 9849.514621] ? __pfx_ksys_write+0x10/0x10 [ 9849.514887] ? do_syscall_64+0x25e/0x1520 [ 9849.515122] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ 9849.515366] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x178/0x1c0 [ 9849.515655] __x64_sys_write+0x72/0xd0 [ 9849.515885] ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x24/0x1c0 [ 9849.516130] x64_sys_call+0x22f/0x2390 [ 9849.516341] do_syscall_64+0x12b/0x1520 [ 9849.516545] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520 [ 9849.516783] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520 [ 9849.517003] ? lock_release+0x318/0x480 [ 9849.517220] ? __x64_sys_io_getevents+0x143/0x2d0 [ 9849.517479] ? percpu_ref_put_many.constprop.0+0x8f/0x210 [ 9849.517779] ? entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 9849.518073] ? do_syscall_64+0x25e/0x1520 [ 9849.518291] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20 [ 9849.518519] ? trace_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x178/0x1c0 [ 9849.518799] ? do_syscall_64+0x27c/0x1520 [ 9 ---truncated--- | ||||