The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early.
An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests.
This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3.
Analysis
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Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||
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| elixir-mint | mint | unaffected |
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| elixir-mint | mint | unaffected |
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Thu, 16 Jul 2026 13:30:00 +0000
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| Metrics |
ssvc
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Thu, 16 Jul 2026 12:15:00 +0000
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| Description | Inconsistent interpretation of HTTP requests (HTTP response smuggling) vulnerability in elixir-mint mint allows a malicious HTTP/1 server to desynchronize a strict intermediary and the Mint client on the same pooled connection, enabling response-queue poisoning against subsequent requests that share the connection. The Mint.HTTP1.decode_body/5 function in lib/mint/http1.ex parses the chunk-size line of a Transfer-Encoding: chunked response with Integer.parse(data, 16). RFC 7230 defines chunk-size = 1*HEXDIG and forbids any sign prefix, but Integer.parse/2 accepts an optional leading + or -. A chunk-size line of +5 is accepted as a five-byte chunk; lines of +0 and -0 are accepted as the terminating zero-length chunk and end the message body early. An RFC-strict intermediary in the response path rejects these forms, so the intermediary and the Mint client disagree on where one response ends and the next begins. On a pooled keep-alive connection, an attacker-influenced origin can inject bytes that the client attributes to the next legitimate response on the same connection, poisoning the response queue and corrupting the responses returned to unrelated in-flight requests. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.3. | |
| Title | Sign-tolerant HTTP/1 chunk-size parser in Mint enables response smuggling against strict intermediaries on pooled connections | |
| First Time appeared |
Elixir-mint
Elixir-mint mint |
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| Weaknesses | CWE-444 | |
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:a:elixir-mint:mint:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Elixir-mint
Elixir-mint mint |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: EEF
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-16T12:38:16.316Z
Reserved: 2026-07-04T04:24:03.652Z
Link: CVE-2026-59249
Vulnrichment
Updated: 2026-07-16T12:38:12.786Z
NVD
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Redhat
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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