Description
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers

The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE
(256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not
zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before
handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp().

qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied
value:

if (len == 1)
opt |= BIT_0;
if (opt & BIT_0)
len = *sfp;

*sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow
up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool
buffer. Since only a small prefix was written
(e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU
status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and
writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device
flash.

Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers
so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap
contents.
Published: 2026-09-16
Score: n/a
EPSS: n/a
KEV: No
Impact: n/a
Action: n/a
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Remediation

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History

Wed, 16 Sep 2026 10:45:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers The FRU and I2C bsg handlers stage their transfer in a DMA_POOL_SIZE (256-byte) bounce buffer obtained from dma_pool_alloc(), which does not zero the allocation. They initialize only a few leading bytes before handing the buffer to qla2x00_write_sfp(). qla2x00_write_sfp() can override the transfer length with a user-supplied value: if (len == 1) opt |= BIT_0; if (opt & BIT_0) len = *sfp; *sfp is the first byte of the (user-controlled) payload, so len can grow up to 255. The device then DMA-reads len bytes from the 256-byte pool buffer. Since only a small prefix was written (e.g. MAX_FRU_SIZE == 36 bytes for a FRU version, one byte for a FRU status register), the hardware reads past the initialized region and writes up to ~219 bytes of stale DMA-pool heap memory to the device flash. Allocate the buffer with dma_pool_zalloc() in all five FRU/I2C handlers so any bytes beyond the initialized data are zero rather than stale heap contents.
Title scsi: qla2xxx: Zero SFP DMA buffer in FRU/I2C bsg handlers
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Subscriptions

Linux Linux Kernel
cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-09-16T10:31:35.758Z

Reserved: 2026-09-11T19:38:34.771Z

Link: CVE-2026-89865

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Received

Published: 2026-09-16T11:16:54.610

Modified: 2026-09-16T11:16:54.610

Link: CVE-2026-89865

cve-icon Redhat

No data.

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

No data.

Weaknesses

No weakness.