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Tue, 22 Sep 2026 19:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Home Assistant is open source home automation software focused on local control and privacy. Prior to 2026.2.3, the IPP integration automatically processed unauthenticated _ipp._tcp.local mDNS announcements in homeassistant/components/ipp/config_flow.py, where async_step_zeroconf passed attacker-controlled host, port, and base_path values to validate_input for printer metadata retrieval. Because the shared HTTP client followed attacker-controlled cross-origin redirects without blocking loopback targets, a local-network attacker could redirect the request to 127.0.0.1 or another internal service without user interaction or prior IPP configuration. This issue is fixed in version 2026.2.3. | |
| Title | Home Assistant: mDNS Server-Side Request Forgery | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-918 | |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Subscriptions
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-22T19:05:15.559Z
Reserved: 2026-09-14T19:36:48.844Z
Link: CVE-2026-91129
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-22T19:16:56.433
Modified: 2026-09-22T19:16:56.433
Link: CVE-2026-91129
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OpenCVE Enrichment
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