net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks()
rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the
path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to
be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling
rds_send_path_reset().
Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit()
can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its
state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the
resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the
bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire
operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss
each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with
rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly
what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to
prevent.
Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and
rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The
lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the
lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg()
can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock.
Two details of the old code go away with the same change:
- t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code
cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown()
releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before
the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading
it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the
teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until
then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths
remain as exposed to each other as they are today.
- The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no
serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal
path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the
previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path
found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect
worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes
RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down
meanwhile and is dropped.
The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is
rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment
above the function (which still described a return value and an
incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four
writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what
serializes each of them.
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Fri, 25 Sep 2026 15:00:00 +0000
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cvssV3_1
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Fri, 25 Sep 2026 10:30:00 +0000
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| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() quiesces the transmit path by setting the path state to RDS_CONN_RESETTING and then waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT to be sampled clear before swapping the underlying socket and calling rds_send_path_reset(). Sampling the bit clear is not the same as owning it: rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT right after the wait_event() returns. Its state recheck after taking the lock is a store-buffering pattern (the resetter writes the state and reads the bit, the sender writes the bit and reads the state) and acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write and the transmit path then runs concurrently with rds_send_path_reset() rewriting cp_xmit_* state - which is exactly what the comment above rds_send_path_reset() tells its callers to prevent. Take the lock instead, hold it across the socket swap and rds_send_path_reset(), and release it with a wake-up at the end. The lock-ordering constraint documented above the wait still holds: the lock is acquired before lock_sock(), so a sender inside tcp_sendmsg() can never be waited on while we hold the socket lock. Two details of the old code go away with the same change: - t_sock is now read only after the lock is acquired. The old code cached it before waiting; the teardown in rds_conn_shutdown() releases that socket and clears t_sock, so a pointer cached before the wait can be stale by the time the accept path resumes. Reading it under RDS_IN_XMIT is what makes the exclusion complete once the teardown owns the same lock, which the next patch arranges; until then the teardown still only samples the bit, and the two paths remain as exposed to each other as they are today. - The old !osock early path called rds_send_path_reset() with no serialization at all. It now runs under the lock like the normal path. The conditional RDS_CONN_RESETTING transition of the previous patch happens before the socket check either way: a path found without a socket is either still connecting (its reconnect worker blocked on t_conn_path_lock) and legitimately goes RESETTING -> UP on the new socket, or it has been torn down meanwhile and is dropped. The in-function comment describing the old wait-based quiesce is rewritten to describe the lock-based one, and the stale block comment above the function (which still described a return value and an incomplete list of t_sock writers) is refreshed to name all four writers - the connect, accept, teardown and swap paths - and what serializes each of them. | |
| Title | net/rds: acquire RDS_IN_XMIT in rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-09-25T14:42:01.245Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:19:56.074Z
Link: CVE-2026-98070
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-09-25T11:17:36.193
Modified: 2026-09-25T15:18:05.427
Link: CVE-2026-98070
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
No weakness.